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ARTICLE 
THE DUTY TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS IN 
HOSTILITIES, AND THE DISOBEYING OF 
ORDERS: SHOULD ROBOTS REFUSE? 
Francis Grimal and Michael J. Pollard* 
“In war the first principle is to disobey orders. Any fool can 
obey an order.”1 
ABSTRACT 
This Article not only questions whether an embodied artificial 
intelligence (“EAI”) could give an order to a human combatant, but 
controversially, examines whether it should also refuse one. A future EAI 
may be capable of refusing to follow an order, for example, where an order 
appeared to be manifestly unlawful, was otherwise in breach of 
International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”), national Rules of 
Engagement (“ROE”) or, even, where they appeared to be immoral or 
unethical. Such an argument has traction in the strategic realm in terms 
of “system of systems”—the premise that more advanced technology can 
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1. Michael Symanski, Any Fool Can Obey an Order, MODERN WAR INST. (Mar. 17, 
2017), https://mwi.usma.edu/fool-can-obey-order/ (“so wrote First Sea Lord Jacky 
Fisher in angry Critique of Captain H.M. Pelly, a cruiser Captain under Admiral Beatty 
at the battle of Dogger Bank in 1915”); see also Ryan Scott, Willful Disobedience: Character 
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potentially help overcome Clausewitzian “friction” or “fog of war.” An 
aircraft’s anti-stall mechanism, which takes over, and corrects human 
error, is seen as nothing less than “positive.” 
As part of opening this much-needed discussion, the Authors 
examine the legal parameters, and by way of a solution provide a 
framework for overriding and disobeying. Central to this discussion, are 
state specific ROEs within the concept of “duty to take precautions.” At 
present, the guidelines relating to a human combatant’s right to disobey 
orders are contained within such doctrine, but vary widely. For example, 
in the United States, a soldier may disobey an order but only when the act 
in question is clearly unlawful. In direct contrast, however, Germany’s 
“state practice” requires orders to be compatible with the much wider 
concept of human dignity, and to be of “use for service.” 
By way of a solution, the Authors propose the crafting of a test 
referred to as “robot rules of engagement” (“RROE”) with specific regard 
to the disobeying of orders. These RROE ensure (via a multi-stage 
verification process) that an EAI can discount human “traits” and 
minimize errors that lead to breaches of IHL. In the broader sense, the 
Authors question whether warfare should remain an utterly human 
preserve—where human error is an unintended but unfortunate 
consequence—or, whether the duty to take all feasible precautions in 
attack in fact require a human commander to utilize available AI systems 
to routinely question human decision-making, and where applicable, 
prevent mistakes. In short, the Article examines whether human error can 
be corrected and overridden, but for the better, rather than for the worse. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article goes significantly beyond traditional boundaries 
of debate surrounding a combatant’s legal obligation to disobey 
unlawful orders,2 and by way of overall solution, presents both a 
legal and strategic “system of systems.” Grounded at the very 
heart or “Schwerpunkt” (to use Clausewitz’s terminology)3 of 
strategic thinking is the concept of “friction” within warfare.4 
Friction, simply-put is more colloquially known as “the fog of 
war”—the concept that within warfare, things will go wrong, and 
mistakes will happen.5 In essence, the Clausewitzian concept of 
 
2. Indeed, to date, the primary focus in this area has been upon the acceptability 
(or not) of the “Nuremberg defense,” in respect of the commission of war crimes. See 
James B. Insco, Defense of Superior Orders before Military Commissions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 389 (2003); Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law 
of War, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 939 (1998); Robert E. Murdough, I Won’t Participate in an Illegal 
War: Military Objectors, the Nuremberg Defense, and the Obligation to Refuse Illegal Orders, 2010 
ARMY L. 4 (2010). 
3. Clausewitz refers to “Schwerpunct” a number of times in the original German 
language edition of his magnus opus, Vom Kreige (On War). The authoritative English 
language edition of On War translates Schwerpunkt to mean “centers of gravity,” the 
notion that in warfare one can identify a “hub of all power and movement, on which 
everything depends . . . the point against which all . . . energies should be directed.” See 
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 720 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds., 1976, rev. ed. 
1984); see also COLIN S. GRAY, MODERN STRATEGY,  75-112 (1999); see, e.g., John E. 
Tashjean, Pious Arms: Clausewitz and the Right of War, 44 MIL. AFF. 82, 83 (1980) 
(providing general works on Clausewitz); see generally CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 
CLAUSEWITZ ON STRATEGY: INSPIRATION AND INSIGHT FROM A MASTER STRATEGIST 
(Christopher Bassford et al. eds., 2001). 
4. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, supra note 3, at 138-40 (at page 138 Clausewitz notes that 
“Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish 
real war from war on paper.”).   
5. Strategic literature is replete with examples. See, e.g., COLIN S. GRAY, AIRPOWER 
FOR STRATEGIC EFFECT 214 (2012). Here, for example, the author discusses sorties being 
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“friction,” is what distinguishes “real war” from war on paper, 
something (despite advances of technology) for which a strategist 
cannot always account.6 Strategic doctrines that failed to account 
for “friction” were deemed as inherently flawed,7 and 
considerable ink was spilt in the 1990s and 2000s to consider the 
means by which to overcome friction in warfare.8 Fully-conscious 
that previous efforts to simply “throw” advanced technology at 
the problem would not resolve the issue,9 strategists formulated 
the idea of “system of systems.”10 Much as with a mechanical 
watch, technology/cogs would be assigned individual tasks, but 
those smaller “cogs” would then form part of a bigger and more 
advanced “system of systems.”11 
As presented above, the Authors propose to transfer this 
strategic concept into the legal realm as a means of providing an 
overall solution. By doing so, they are able to consider how, and 
more importantly when, various “individuals” within the chain of 
command (e.g., human to Autonomous Weapon System (“AWS”); AWS 
 
abandoned during the Kosovo conflict due to foggy conditions near the bases in Terano, 
Italy; the negative impact of bad weather (in the form of rain) in Vietnam; and even how 
relatively modern operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were negatively affected. 
6. Id. at 44-45. 
7. See, e.g., BARRY D. WATTS, THE FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. AIR DOCTRINE: THE 
PROBLEM OF FRICTION IN WAR 47-54 (2012). Watts discusses the doctrine of Strategic Air 
Power (“SAP”), a relatively simple notion that airpower alone is sufficient (in the military 
sense) to bring about victory. According to Watts, SAP failed to live up to its promise due 
to lack of “frictional” considerations. Despite technological advances, rain, fog, and the 
climate as a whole prevented SAP from operating in certain instances. 
8. Id. Furthermore, as noted and reinforced by Watts, failure to account for friction 
prevents any strategic doctrine from fulfilling its potential. However, as with all doctrines, 
there is not just one overriding factor (although the omission of “frictional 
considerations”) is probably the most significant. 
9. Id. 
10. See GRAY, supra note 5, at 106. 
11. In short, a system-of-systems is a collection of independent systems/elements 
that are each allotted a specific task. They each complete this task without necessarily 
having to consult other systems/ elements—in a vehicle, this could, for example, be 
power steering. However, sometimes a group of such systems can be considered 
holistically, with the result of the overarching system being much more advanced, and 
capable, than any of the individual elements could be alone—a self-driving car, for 
example, would need many individual components, perhaps including GPS, radar, lidar, 
and other sensors, automatic braking, lane recognition, self-parking, cameras, and, not 
least, a central processor. None of these systems alone, however, could ever ensure a 
vehicle getting safely from A to B. See, e.g., Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (NHSTA), https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-
innovation/automated-vehicles-safety [https://perma.cc/8PKB-GY7W] (last visited Feb. 
18, 2021).  
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to human; EAI to AWS, human to EAI) would be able to correctly 
reject and overturn an erroneous and unlawful order.12 
Throughout, the Authors argue that simply transposing a 
combatant’s right and duty to disobey an unlawful order into the 
EAI realm without further scrutiny is unwise, for it would close 
the door on a much-needed discussion in terms of how EAIs 
could potentially remove human error or “friction” in warfare.13 
In terms of a unique and novel solution, the Authors 
envisage the following: the EAI (when 
considering any order) will not only run a continuous/dynamic 
proportionality assessment (an implicit factor of which is a 
perpetual target verification mechanism), but will also identify 
whether the human decision is motivated by human character 
“flaws” such as revenge or self-preservation. Where the EAI is 
satisfied that the order is IHL compliant but that human error is 
in evidence, the EAI should reject that human command. While 
there is undoubtably a concern that EAIs might increase 
“friction” (due to their behavior) the Authors counter such a 
possibility by implementing the following: when it comes to a 
human to EAI order in the chain of command the Authors 
suggest several cogs and levels within this “system of systems” with 
each one independently making a specific determination. 
Consequently, each independent system would be tasked with 
only one computation. This is set this out comprehensively, and 
considered alongside a number of scenarios  in Part IV. Here, the 
Authors consider the system-of-systems in its most extreme 
setting—“robot refusal” of nuclear launch. 
An additional, but natural (and indeed desirable) 
implication of this discussion is whether the threshold is raised—
the extra layers of “protection” proposed by the Authors imply 
that IHL obligations are set much higher. One could readily 
argue that an EAI’s calculations place it under a higher burden 
in terms of assessment and accountability of information when 
 
12. As the analysis that follows demonstrates, there is presently some deviation in 
state practice with respect to exactly which orders a soldier should disobey. 
13. Note robot refusal in this realm is a controversial discussion, not least because 
some commentators hold that in order for a soldier to disobey an unlawful order (and 
therefore to any machine equivalent) “they must exercise ‘agency’ and engage in 
nuanced reasoning.” See Tetyana Krupiy, Unravelling Power Dynamics in Organizations: An 
Accountability Framework for Crimes Triggered by Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, 15 LOY. 
U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 1, 15 (2017). 
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taking a particular decision. Ostensibly, the Authors’ analysis is 
distilled into three distinct areas: first, the understanding and 
scrutiny of existing guidelines regarding the duty to take 
precautions: wide (United States); narrow (Germany). Second, 
the way in which the guidelines are interpreted with regard to the 
right to refusal: wide (Germany); narrow (United States). Finally, 
the Authors propose a solution to the existing variations in 
application by introducing an additional test. This provides a 
method for determining precisely how an EAI may refuse 
erroneous human command. The Authors believe this discussion 
is necessary due to the fact that  as long as there is human 
involvement, there will always be human error. 
While one could argue that there are more things that could 
“go wrong” (due to technological limitations of 21st century 
technology), to suggest that this will remain the status quo, is 
dismissive of advances in machine learning.14 While the absolute 
and complete removal of error is difficult to envisage, one could 
analogize such a step with an anti-stall mechanism in an aircraft—
a simple and existing technology which innocuously overrides 
human error for the “better.” 15 In other words, while the 
Authors’ proposed “system of systems” regarding refusal may not 
 
14. See George Anadiotis, The state of AI in 2019: Breakthroughs in machine learning, 
natural language processing, games, and knowledge graphs, ZDNET (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-state-of-ai-in-2019-breakthroughs-in-machine-
learning-natural-language-processing-games-and-knowledge-graphs/ 
[https://perma.cc/V82E-3AV9] (providing a useful and relaxed discussion about recent 
breakthroughs in machine learning and possible future developmental trajectories). 
15. A stall is defined as “a sudden reduction in the lift generated by an aerofoil 
when the critical angle of attack is reached or exceeded.” Stall, SKYBRARY, 
https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Stall [https://perma.cc/NL3P-BAJF] (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2021). Anti-stall systems automatically reduce the pitch of the aircraft nose 
where, for example, the angle of attack is exceeded due to pilot error. They are typically 
considered so effective that they are a requirement on all transport aircrafts. Id. However, 
the system is not a complete failsafe, and following a spate of incidents in 2019, a 
malfunctioning anti-stall was responsible for grounding Boeing’s entire fleet of 737 Max 
aircraft. See Gwyn Topham, Anti-stall system was ‘in play’ on Ethiopian’s Boeing 737 Max, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/25/anti-
stall-system-was-in-play-on-ethiopians-boeing-737-max [https://perma.cc/9XA2-EKDD]; 
David Shepardson & Jamie Freed, FAA failed to properly review 737 MAX jet’s anti-stall system 
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fully eradicate “friction,” its negative effects will have been 
significantly reduced and constrained.16 
The heart of this Article is the proposition that future EAIs 
will possess sufficient decision-making capabilities in order for 
them to be considered, prima facie, “conscious.”17 By way of 
overview, the Article is structured as follows: Part II of the Article 
examines the way in which the Duty to Take Precautions operates 
as a whole within the IHL realm. Specific focus is placed upon 
state practice so as to make the necessary link between the Duty 
to Take Precautions and the disobeying of orders. Part III 
examines the specific interface between the legal obligations 
contained in IHL, and their translation into state-based ROEs. 
Part IV introduces the Authors’ “stress test,” and the logistics of 
“robot refusal” in terms of providing a concrete legal test for 
determining when an erroneous command (whatever its 
designation: human, autonomous or EAI) should be rejected and 
refused. Finally, Part V considers some of the wider implications 
of EAI refusal, specifically with regard to robot spies and robot 
private military contractors. 
II. DUTY TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
Prevailing discussion within the existing scholarship 
regarding AWS and EAI systems falling under the scope of IHL 
has understandably centered on whether such systems can satisfy 
the necessary distinction and proportionality requirements.18 
 
16. Existing military systems including satellite and thermal imaging, 3D mapping, 
and real-time battlefield updates received from various robots located in and around the 
battlespace already operate at speeds far in excess of human capabilities. However, such 
technologies will inevitably be surpassed, and overtaken in the not too distant future. 
17. Indeed, the Authors acknowledge that this examination of robot refusal sits 
alongside a much wider philosophical, ethical and legal debate regarding robot 
sentience and the concept of robot refusal. Should a “sex”-robot, for example, be 
entitled to say no, and, should there be consequences for it, and/or for the “client” who 
chooses to ignore such an instruction? See Robert Sparrow, Robots, Rape, and 
Representation, 9 INT. J. SOC. ROBOTICS 465, 465-77 (2017); Neda Atanasoski & Kalindi 
Vora, Why the Sex Robot Becomes the Killer Robot – Reproduction, Care, and the Limits of Refusal, 
SPHERES J. 1, 3 (2020); Lily Frank & Sven Nyholm, Robot sex and consent: Is consent to sex 
between a robot and a human conceivable, possible, and desirable?, 25 ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLEGENCE &  L. 305, 305-23 (2017). 
18. See, e.g., Neil Davidson, A legal perspective: Autonomous weapon systems under 
international humanitarian law, in UNODA OCCASIONAL PAPERS NO. 30: PERSPECTIVES ON 
LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS 5, 7 (2017); Marco Sassoli, Autonomous Weapons 
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Equally, the general corpus of literature regarding the duty to 
take precautions during armed conflict is also relatively well-
established.19 Consequently, the Authors navigate the key 
contours of this landscape without over elaboration. Rather, the 
purpose and focus of Part II is to identify how the duty to take 
precautions (“DTP”) fits within the larger corpus of IHL. At its 
core, the following section confirms the Authors’ firm assertation 
that future commanders will have to use EAIs as part of their DTP, 
and ultimately, to “respect” their decision not to follow orders. 
A. How Does the Duty Take Precautions Fit Within IHL? 
The purpose of this Section is twofold. First, the Authors 
identify a combatant’s lawful obligation to take precautions in 
attack that is contained within Article 57 of Additional Protocol I 
(“API”).20 Secondly, the Authors demonstrate how the customary 
duty to disobey a manifestly unlawful order is applicable to 
increasingly autonomous technologies such as EAIs. 
IHL strives to “achieve” the thankless task of reconciling two 
fundamental values operating at opposing ends of a “spectrum.”21 
These are: 1) the protection of civilian life and civilian objects; 
and 2) the concept of military necessity.22 Considerable attention 
 
and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues 
to be Clarified, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 308, 338-40 (2014); Chantal Grut, The Challenge of 
Autonomous Lethal Robotics to International Humanitarian Law, 18 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 5, 
5 (2013); Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous weapon systems and international humanitarian 
law: a reply to the critics, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 8 (2013). 
19. See, e.g., Thurnher J.S., Feasible Precautions in Attack and Autonomous Weapons, in 
DEHUMANIZATION OF WARFARE (Heintschel von Heinegg et al. eds., 2018); see Michael 
N. Schmitt, Precision attack and international humanitarian law, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
445 (2005); Geoffrey Corn & James A. Schoettler, Targeting and Civilian Risk Mitigation: 
The Essential Role of Precautionary Measures, 223 MIL. L. REV. 785 (2015). 
20. Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API]. 
21. The ICRC identifies that “International humanitarian law is a set of rules which 
seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict.” See What is 
International Humanitarian Law?, ICRC, 
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MQ5U-NVUL] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). However, while IHL 
clearly does provide a number of obvious protections for both civilians and combatants, 
the point is it does not prevent or outlaw war.    
22. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”): “The 
‘principle of military necessity’ permits measures which are actually necessary to 
accomplish a legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by 
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has been dedicated to the “achievement” (or not) of this 
precarious balance, and the Authors do not seek to further that 
particular discussion.23 Nevertheless, the legal barometers of 
distinction and proportionality act as safeguards to ensure that 
reconciliation between the two fundamental values takes place in 
practice. The first of these two principles is captured by Article 48 
API which provides the “basic rule.”24 This ensures that civilians—
and civilian objects—are distinguished from military objectives. 
“Distinction” is clearly intended to reflect the protectionist ambit 
of the IHL balancing act. Once the distinction has been made, 
Article 51 (2) API ensures that civilians and civilian objects must 
not be made the object of a direct attack,25 while also prohibiting 
threats of violence where their use is intended to spread terror.26 
Article 57 API refers specifically to precautions in attack. 
Article 57(1) states, “[i]n the conduct of military operations, 
constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, 
 
international humanitarian law. In the case of an armed conflict the only legitimate 
military purpose is to weaken the military capacity of the other parties to the conflict.” 
Military Necessity, ICRC, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/military-necessity 
[https://perma.cc/89DZ-J3CQ] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
23. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 8-12 (3d ed. 2016) (the author identifies the need to 
balance these two “driving forces” of IHL); Nobuo Hayashi, Requirements of Military 
Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, 28 B.U. INT’L 
L.J. 39, 41 (2010); see generally Yishai Beer, Humanity Considerations Cannot Reduce War’s 
Hazards Alone: Revitalizing the Concept of Military Necessity, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 801, 801 
(2015). 
24. API, supra note 20, art. 48, at 36 (“In order to ensure respect for and protection 
of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.”). 
25. Id. art. 52, at 38. See also id. art. 49, at 36 (“‘Attacks’ means acts of violence 
against an adversary, whether in offence or defence.”). 
26. The full text Article 51 (2) API reads: “The civilian population as such, as well 
as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited.” Id. art. 51(2). Note also that Article 51(3) API states: “Civilians shall enjoy 
the protection offered by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities” (“DPH”). Id. art. 51(3), at 37. Exactly which actions should qualify as 
playing a DPH is the subject of some conjecture. For an in-depth analysis of the two 
leading schools of thought, see Francis Grimal & Michael J. Pollard, “Embodied AI” and 
The Direct Participation in Hostilities, 51 GEO. J. INT’L L. 513 (2020) (the Authors’ previous 
piece discussing EAIs and DPH). 
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civilians and civilian objects.”27 And, Article 57(2) provides 
further detail supplying that: 
 . . . a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: (i) do 
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked 
are neither civilians nor civilian objects . . . [and] . . . (ii) take 
all feasible precautions in the choice of means and method 
of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing, 
incidental loss of life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
objects.28 
Although it is not referred to explicitly. the principle of 
proportionality is contained within Article 57(2)(a)(iii) API. This 
ensures that a combatant must refrain from launching an attack 
where the damage caused to civilians or civilian objects “would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”29 This provision acknowledges the concept of 
military necessity and, in doing so, that “situations may arise 
where civilians simply cannot be spared.”30 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of 
the Rome Statute identifies that carrying out a disproportionate 
attack is a war crime.31 According to the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), proportionality is customary in 
 
27. API, supra note 20, art. 57(1), at 41 (This is known as the “constant care” 
obligation, to which more attention is given in the discussion which follows.). 
28. API, supra note 20, art. 57(2)(a)(i)-(ii). 
29. Though note this provision does not refer to proportionality directly. 
Nevertheless, as the ICJ identified in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (Higgins, J., dissenting) [hereinafter 
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion], API ensures that, “a legitimate target may not be 
attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific 
military gain . . . .”  See also DINSTEIN, supra, note 23, at 152, 158 (noting that “military 
advantage and civilian casualties/damage are incomparable in a quantifiable manner . . . 
[and that] . . . [t]here is little prospect of agreement between opposing Belligerent 
Parties as to the rival values of . . . [these concepts].”). 
30. DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 164 (citing FRITS KALSHOVEN, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
LAW OF WAR: COLLECTED ESSAYS 346, 546 (2007)). 
31. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 
states: “For the purpose of this statute, ‘war crimes’ means: Intentionally launching an 
attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to 
civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct overall military advantage anticipated.” 
2021] SHOULD ROBOTS REFUSE? 681 
nature,32 as is the separate duty to take precautions in attack.33 
These obligations are therefore placed upon all states regardless 
of whether or not they are party to API—which enables due 
consideration of US practice.34 
Article 35(1) API is relevant to DTP, stating, “ . . . the right 
of the Parties to choose methods or means or warfare is not 
unlimited.”35 Here, the term “means” refers to the choice of 
weapon—obligating the attacker to select “weapons and 
munitions,” that prevent “‘overkill.’”36 “[M]ethods” of attack 
include, “angles of attack,” “time on target,” and “similar tactical 
choices.”37 If an attacker has a choice of means and method to 
achieve a legitimate military objective, they “should” choose the 
one that “is likely to cause the least collateral damage or 
incidental injury.”38 
 
32. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOL. 
I: RULES (2005) [hereinafter ICRC Customary Rules] (ICRC Customary Rule 14, states: 
“[l]aunching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is 
prohibited . . . State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international 
law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”). 
33. See id. (“[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to 
spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must 
be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects . . . State practice establishes this rule as a norm 
of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts.” 
34. The United States is not currently a party to API. 
35. See Regulation 22 annexed to the Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of 
War on Land (IV), Oct. 18, 1907 (“The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring 
the enemy is not unlimited”); Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 29, at 10-11 
(identifying that nations “do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means of 
weapons.”); see generally DINSTEIN, supra note 23; see generally STUART CASEY-MASLEN & 
STEVEN HAINES, HAGUE LAW INTERPRETED: THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2018) (the authors, for example, argue that the ICJ 
“strangely,” and incorrectly, limited the principle to weapons that caused unnecessary 
suffering to combatants). 
36. See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 164. 
37. See id. 
38. Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21 Century Warfare, 2 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 152 (1999); see ICRC Customary Rules, supra note 32 (ICRC 
Customary Rule 17 restates art. 57 (2)(a)(ii): “Each party to the conflict must take all 
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare with a view to 
avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians 
and damage to civilian objects.”). 
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This final statement is central to the discussion relating to the 
concept of robot refusal. And, it is the cord that binds the present 
discussion with that in Part III. As the Authors have argued 
elsewhere, the introduction of increasingly advanced AI 
technology into warfare is inevitable.39 For example, an EAI could 
be an advanced theatre ballistic missile that was capable of 
conducting an additional distinction and proportionality 
assessment before striking its target. If the “on-board” tech 
identified, for example, that the intended target was positioned 
next to a hospital, it could choose to withdraw or self-destruct 
before carrying out the attack. However, an EAI might equally be 
an unarmed reconnaissance platform, or even a (unarmed) 
humanoid member of a special ops group (for the sake of the 
present article an EAI is distinguished from an AWS by way of the 
fact that while an EAI can refuse to follow an order to apply force, 
an AWS (once activated) can make targeting decisions and chose 
to apply force independently of human supervision and/or 
instruction). Regardless, such EAI systems will be capable of 
monitoring live feeds of battlefield conditions outside of the 
immediate area, and as a result, determine the “relative” value of 
a target.40 These systems would then direct human decision-
makers accordingly. Furthermore, an EAI, or AI software could 
be utilized in command and control to support high-end 
operational decision-making regarding the deployment and 
movement of strategic assets. Systems such as this may encourage 
decision-making that changes the very operational fabric of an 
armed conflict. 
No matter which type of AI is at the operator’s disposal, 
however, (leaving aside the matter of whether it offers an 
improvement in the means or methods of warfare), there will be 
occasions where a decision-maker must utilize it. To not do so, and 
to instead use an alternative means that causes greater civilian 
harms, would breach the DTP obligation.41 This is a natural 
 
39. See Grimal & Pollard, supra note 26, at 520. 
40. See generally Sassoli, supra note 18, at 339. 
41. It is important to note that an attacker does not have to use a particular weapon, 
or tactic, just because it will lessen the amount of collateral damage. A commander who 
is in possession of a limited number of platforms, may for example, decide that there 
would be more efficiently deployed elsewhere, or, with only a limited number of 
munitions, decide that it would be more effective not to use one in the present 
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continuation of the well-versed discussion of Schmitt and 
Widmar, who note the loitering capabilities of UAVs’ (unmanned 
aerial vehicles) significantly enhance target verification.42 Central 
to the current discussion, is the postulation that where tech is 
capable of conducting additional distinction or proportionality 
assessments, it must also be capable of saying “no.” This is 
analogous to existing operations whereby the tactical team on the 
ground can see that the actual circumstances are manifestly 
different to those that were imagined when the attack was 
ordered.43 
In all scenarios the decision regarding the most appropriate 
means and methods are framed by the concept of “feasibility.” 
This means, in planning an attack, a combatant must (as a 
minimum) do only what is “feasible” to verify civilians or civilian 
objects (hereinafter “feasible varication”), and that a means or 
method should avoid, or at least minimize, collateral damage 
(hereinafter “feasible precautions”). This means the tactical team 
may decide to consummate the attack because of a high target 
value. Though equally, command and control may choose to 
extract the team and authorize the use of an over-the-horizon 
precision strike instead. What is feasible in the circumstances 
however, is inherently contextual.44 Moreover, the term “feasible” 
is itself subject to various interpretations. Notably, there is no 
supplementary clarification or definition of the term within 
either API, the wider Geneva Conventions, or the Additional 
Protocols.45 Instead, one must look to an alternate treaty to locate 
 
circumstances. See Michael N. Schmitt & Eric W. Widmar, “On Target”: Precision and 
Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y  379, 400-04 (2014). 
42. See id. at 401. 
43. But see id. at 401 (noting that sometimes a tactical situation can change after a 
targeting decision has been made, but beyond the point at which an attack can be called 
off.). 
44. Corn & Schoettler, supra note 19, at 802; see, e.g., Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 
41. 
45. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention IV]; Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
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a codified definition.46 A regularly cited example of this can be 
found in Article 3(10) of the Protocol II Annexed to the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (“CCCW”), which 
states: 
[f]easible precautions are those precautions which are 
practicable or practically possible taking into account all 
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian 
and military considerations.47 
This is, therefore, generally understood to be the standard 
by which feasibility is assessed.48 And, clearly, it acknowledges the 
delicate balance between the need to protect the civilian 
population and the concept of military necessity.49 Two authors 
note that the ICRC identifies that “practicable or practically 
possible entails ‘common sense and good faith,’”50 and that the 
feasibility standard is based upon the concept of 
“reasonableness.”51 The brief examination that follows cross-
references a number of statements or codifications of feasibility 
within past or present military doctrines in order to identify if they 
offer something more tangible. Previously, US doctrine has stated 
 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol (II) Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional 
Protocol II]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), Dec. 8, 
2005, T.I.A.S. No. 07–908 [hereinafter Additional Protocol III]. 
46. See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 165; Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 41, at 400 
(directing the reader’s attention to art. 3(4) CCCW); see generally ICRC Customary Rules, 
supra note 32; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 
1125, U.N.T.S. 3, UK Reservation; see, e.g., Article 3(10) of Amended Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Mines, Booby Traps, and other Devices, May 3, 
1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter Amended CCW Protocol II]; ICRC Customary Rules, 
supra note 32, Customary Rule 15. 
47. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices art. 3, Oct. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1523 [hereinafter CCCW]. 
48. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 41, at 400. 
49. Id. at 402 (“attackers need only select a less harmful means or methods that do 
not involve sacrificing military advantage and that are feasible.”). 
50. Id. at 400; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 681 (Yves 
Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). 
51. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 41, at 400-01. 
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that its position reflects Article 3(10) CCCW.52 Arguably, however, 
the this places greater emphasis upon military operations than it 
does humanitarian concerns, as it removes any reference to the 
latter.53 UK, German, Australian and Canadian doctrine reflects 
Article 3(10) CCCW more precisely—the text appearing in the 
manuals of each being virtually identical.54 Similarly, though 
perhaps more liberally, French doctrine notes feasibility is “that 
which can be realized or which is possible in practice, taking into 
account all circumstances ruling at the time, including 
humanitarian and military considerations.”55 
There is slight variation between these alternative 
interpretations, though each example does merely refer in some 
way to “what is possible” in the circumstances. And, given the 
 
52. See IV OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE 
REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE 
IN ARMED CONFLICTS GENEVA (1974-1977) 241 (1977); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 361 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts et al. eds., 
2005) [hereinafter ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules]. The United States 
referred to “that which is practicable or practically possible, taking into account all 
circumstances at the time, including those relevant to the success of military operations,” 
rather than mirroring art. 3(4) where the final sentence reads: “including humanitarian 
and military considerations.” Id. This was very similar to the German stance before the 
ratification of API. See IV OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE 
REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE 
IN ARMED CONFLICTS GENEVA (1974-1977) 226 (1977) (stating that for the sake of Art. 57 
API, feasible should mean: what “is practicable or practically possible, taking into 
account all circumstances at the time, including those relevant to the success of military 
operations.”). 
53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
54. For the United Kingdom doctrine, see United Kingdom, Declarations and 
Reservations Made upon Ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 28 Jan. 1998, § b 
(UK); for the German doctrine, see Germany, Declarations made upon Ratification of 
the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 14 Feb. 1991, § 2 (Ger.); for the Australian doctrine, see 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 3 (Defence Publ’g Serv., 2006) (the glossary states that feasible 
precautions are those “which are practicable or practically possible taking into account 
all circumstances ruling at the time including humanitarian and military 
considerations”); for the Canada doctrine, see Canada, Reservations Made upon 
Ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 20 Nov. 1990 (Can.); see also CHIEF OF THE 
DEFENCE STAFF, USE OF FORCE FOR CF OPERATIONS §112.6 (2008) (“‘Feasible’ is 
understood as that which is practicable or practicably possible, taking into account all 
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”). 
See also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 15: The Principle of 
Precautions in Attack, ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE (2005), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule15#top 
[https://perma.cc/43ZW-77MP] [hereinafter ICRC Database Rule 15]. 
55.  ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing Reservations and declarations 
made upon ratification of the of the 1977 Additional Protocol, §3 (2003)). 
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inherently contextual nature of warfare, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that these examples do little to add much in the way 
of extrinsic context. Consequently, when this brief examination 
is considered in isolation, any difference in interpretation is 
arguably only a matter of semantics. 
In summary, this Section has demonstrated that DTP is 
intertwined with the IHL principles of distinction and 
proportionality. DTP therefore, plays a pivotal role in 
maintaining the critical balance between the protection of the 
civilian population and the concept of military necessity. There 
is, perhaps, a slight variation in state interpretation of the concept 
of feasibility. Nevertheless, in order to adhere with DTP 
obligations, there will undoubtably be instances in the future 
where—in order to ensure that everything practicably possible 
has been done to verify a target, or to minimize collateral 
damage—a commander will have to utilize an EAI/ AWS.56 
B. State Practice 
With reference to the six military powers that were 
considered in the previous Section,57 the following discussion 
underlines state practice (with specific regard to the 
interpretation of the duty to take precautions within IHL) that 
goes beyond the concept of “feasibility.” N.B. The Authors do not 
envisage consideration of “state practice” in terms of the 
formation process of a customary international rule58 though of 
course, one could suggest that if there is a suitable variance 
 
56. A question that may be raised here is whether a commander may discharge 
his/her duty by deploying a weapon which is independently capable of doing everything 
“feasible” in terms of making real-time CDEM assessments. In other words, could 
deploying an EAI lessen the burden upon the human commander? A full investigation 
is beyond the scope of the current discussion; however, due to the fluidity of armed 
conflict, the “fog” and/or unpredictability of war, this is perhaps unlikely. 
57. For the sake of this Article, leading nations are considered to be those that have 
a (global firepower) power index that ranks them number twenty-five or above. See 2020 
Military Strength Ranking, GLOBAL FIRE POWER (2020), 
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp [https://perma.cc/5AGF-
225D]; see also Ellen Ioanes, This is How the US and Iran Rank Among the World’s 25 Most 
Powerful Militaries, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2020, 4:48 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-ranked-2019-
9?r=US&IR=T [https://perma.cc/5ANP-85YC]. 
58. For a useful discussion regarding the state practice and opinion juris, the 
elements that need to be satisfied in this sense, see DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 16-17. 
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present between states it may undermine the idea that there is 
overall consistency in this respect.59 The following examination is 
conducted  with a considerable focus upon Article 57 API. 
Ultimately, however, it is during the processes of “feasible 
verification” and “feasible precaution” as per Article 57(2)(a)(i) 
and Article 57(2)(a)(ii) API respectively60 that the Authors wish 
to ground their discussion in terms of rejecting an order. 
 In the first instance, the doctrine of all six states references 
the wider “constant care” obligation. While in the majority of 
cases the language utilized broadly reflects Article 57 (1),61 one 
US Naval manual, once again, refers specifically to the concept of 
“reasonableness.”62 Arguably, “all reasonable precautions” 
implies a lesser obligation than that of say, Germany, whose 
manuals identify “all necessary precautions.” A similar 
discrepancy appears with regard to feasible verification.63 Here, a 
 
59. DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 16-17. 
60. API, supra note 20, art. 57(2)(a)(i)-(ii). 
61. See generally ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 337-
38 (citing AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, MANUAL ON LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 
OPERATION SERIES, ADFT 37 – INTERIM EDITION § 556 (1994) (Australia’s Defence Force 
Manual  states: “[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to 
spare the civilian population and civilian objects to the maximum extent possible.”)); 
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL 
AND TACTICAL LEVELS §15 (1999) (“civilians are entitled to protection from the dangers 
arising from military operations. In conducting operations care should always be taken 
to spare civilians and civilian objects.”); DIRECTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 98 (2000) (“In the conduct of military 
operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and 
civilian objects.”); GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICTS MANUAL § 404 (“The civilian population as such as well as individual 
civilians . . . shall be spared as far as possible.”); see also ICRC Database Rule 15, supra 
note 54 (citing CTR. FOR INNER LEADERSHIP, HUMANITARIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
ARMED CONFLICTS – PRINCIPLES 4 (2006) (“When attacking a military objective, all 
necessary precautions shall be taken to spare as far as possible the civilian population 
located in the area or in the immediate vicinity of the object.”)); MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 
THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 5.23 (2004) (“In the 
conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian 
population, civilians and civilian objects.”). 
62. ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 8.1 (2007) (“[t]he law 
of targeting, therefore, requires that all reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure 
that only military objectives are targeted so that noncombatants, civilians, and civilian 
objects are spared as much as possible from the ravages of war.”)). 
63. See ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 367-70 
(“[e]ach party to the conflict must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military 
objectives . . . [and that] . . . state practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary 
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German commander is required to positively verify every target, 64 
where in contrast US doctrine, once again requires reasonable 
precautions to be taken.65 UK doctrine states a decision-maker 
can only be expected to do everything feasible.66 As do 
Australian,67 and Canadian doctrines.68 French doctrine, 
however, mirrors the German requirement to “verify that the 
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian 
objects.”69 In practice, it may prove difficult to identify the 
existence of a large disparity between what might be considered 
reasonable, and what is considered necessary. However, on paper 
at least, “individual” practice with regard to target verification can 
be established. As a result, while French and German armed 
forces may be “required” to deploy future EAIs as often as is 
possible, the United States is likely to give their decision-makers 
more maneuverability when faced with the option. 
The obligation to avoid, or at least minimize incidental 
damage (ICRC Rule 15) represents one of two elements of the 
 
international law applicable in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts.”). 
64. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 16: Targeting 
Verification, ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE (2005), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule15#top 
[https://perma.cc/63NC-LGGZ] [hereinafter ICRC Database Rule 16]; GERMAN 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS MANUAL § 457 
(“Before engaging an objective, every responsible military leader shall verify the military 
nature of the objective to be attacked.”).  
65. See DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS § 8.1 (2007). 
66. Id.; MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT § 13.32 (2004) (“(a) those who plan, decide upon or execute an attack must 
take all feasible measures to gather information which will assist in determining whether 
or not objects which are not military objectives are present in an area of attack, (b) in 
the light of the information available to them, those who plan, decide upon or execute 
an attack shall do everything feasible to ensure that attacks are limited to military 
objectives.”). 




68. Id.; CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF, USE OF FORCE FOR CF OPERATIONS § 112.2 
(2008) (“All feasible precautions must be taken to verify that the target is a military 
objective, and not a civilian or a civilian object, and that it is not subject to any of the 
specialized regimes of protection which prohibit, or severely restrict, attacks on certain 
persons and objects.”). 
69. DIRECTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MANUAL OF ARMED CONFLICT 98 
(2001). 
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concept of feasible precautions.70 As noted, the other refers to the 
means and method of attack (ICRC Rule 17).71 Given that the 
United States is not a party to API, these “customary” rules are 
also considered individually for the sake of the following 
examination. With regards to Rule 15, US,72 and Australian 
doctrines refer, once again, to the concept of reasonableness.73 
This is repeated by Canadian doctrine,74 though further guidance 
also states military operations should be “conducted in such a way 
that damage to civilians and their property is minimized . . . 
[and] . . . only the necessary force that causes the least amount of 
collateral civilian damage” is used.75 French Doctrine requires 
“all precautions,”76 while German returns to the concept of “all 
feasible precautions.”77 Finally, UK guidance states that 
“[p]recautions must be taken . . . to avoid civilian death or injury 
and damage to civilian objects”,78 and perhaps a little more 
ambiguously, “[c]are must be taken . . . .”79 
 
70. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 15. Principle of Precautions on Attack, ICRC 
CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE (2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule15 [https://perma.cc/3LG6-FZ9M] [hereinafter ICRC Rule 
15]. 
71. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 17. Choice of Means and Methods of Warfare, 
ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE (2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule17 [https://perma.cc/E7H4-379T] [hereinafter ICRC Rule 
17]. 
72. ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 8.3.1(2007)) 
(“commanders must take all reasonable precautions, taking into account military and 
humanitarian considerations, to keep civilian casualties and damage to the minimum 
consistent with mission accomplishment . . . .”). 
73. AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE DOCTRINE PUBL’N 06.4: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 5.53 
(2006) (“all reasonable precautions must be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to 
civilians and civilian objects and locations. It is therefore important to obtain accurate 
intelligence before mounting an attack.”). 
74. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 345; see also OFFICE 
OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND 
TACTICAL LEVELS §711.3 (2001). 
75. ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing § 4, Rule 2 of Canada’s Code of 
Conduct (2005)); see also Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, § 4, Rule 2 (Can.). 
76. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 346 (citing 
DIRECTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LOAC TEACHING NOTE 2 (2000)). 
77. Id. (citing GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICTS MANUAL § 510).  
78. ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., THE 
JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 317, § 12.26 (2004)). 
79. ICRC Database Rule 15, supra note 54 (citing MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICT, D/DAT/13/35/66, ARMY CODE 71130 § 4(b) (1981)). 
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Consequently, although “feasibility” is a central focus of the 
six states’ national doctrines, each arguably exhibits a small 
degree of divergence in terms of interpretation of Rule 15. 
Moreover, with regard to Rule 17, Australian doctrine80 identifies 
that while military decision-makers must do everything feasible to 
ensure collateral damage is minimized, “the existence of 
precision guided weapons munitions . . . does not mean they must 
necessarily be used.”81 This is a stance that is reflected by US 
doctrine, which states: 
The commander must decide, in light of all the facts 
known or reasonably available to him, including the 
need to conserve resources and complete the mission 
successfully, whether to adopt an alternative method of 
attack, if reasonably available, to reduce civilian 
casualties and damage Under the heading of 
“proportionality.”82 
Canadian doctrine refers back to Article 57(2),83 and 
similarly, a French manual states that decision-makers shall “take 
all precautions which are practically possible in the choice of 
means and methods of attack . . . .”84 German doctrine is, 
however, more stringent requiring that “before engaging an 
objective, every responsible military leader shall . . . choose means 
and methods minimizing incidental injury and damage to civilian 
life and objects.”85 Prima facie, this narrow obligation is also a 
 
80. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 17. Choice of Means and 
Methods of Warfare, ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE (2005), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule17 [https://perma.cc/P88W-
65ZN] [hereinafter ICRC Database Rule 17] (citing AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, 
MANUAL ON LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, OPERATION SERIES, ADFT 37 – INTERIM EDITION 
§ 556(e) (1994)). 
81. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 376 (citing 
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, MANUAL ON LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, OPERATION SERIES, 
ADFT 37 – INTERIM EDITION § 834 (1994)).  
82. ICRC Database Rule 17, supra note 80 (DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 8.3.1(2007)). 
83.  ICRC Database Rule 17, supra note 80 (citing CANADIAN FORCES JOINT PUBL’N, 
USE OF FORCE FOR CF OPERATIONS § 112.4 (2008) (“[a]l feasible precautions must be 
taken in the choice of means and methods of attack to avoid, and in any event to 
minimize, incidental civilian loss and damage (i.e., collateral damage.”)). 
84. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 377 (citing 
DIRECTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MANUAL OF ARMED CONFLICT 2 § 5.2 (2001)). 
85. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 377 (citing 
GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 
MANUAL § 457). 
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requirement of UK armed forces.86 However, the UK Manual 
states this is only where feasible.87 With the Part II analysis nearing 
completion, three primary interpretive tracks have come to the 
fore; (i) the narrow interpretation, (ii) the treaty-based 
interpretation, and (iii) the wide interpretation. These are 



























86. See MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 82 §5.32.4 (2004) (“There is the obligation to select the means (that is, 
weapons) or methods of attack (that is, tactics) which will cause the least incidental 
damage commensurate with military success.”). 
87.  See MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 83 (2004). 
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US 
“ . . . conservation of 
resources . . . [and] 
. . . reasonable 
availability . . .” 
  Aus. 
“ . . . where 
reasonable . . .” 
Aus. 
“ . . . consider wider 
mission objectives . . .” 
  Can. 
“ . . . where 






“ . . . maximum extent 
possible . . .” 
Aus. 
“ . . . feasible 
precautions . . .” 
  
Can. 
“ . . . care should always be 
taken . . .” 
Can. 
“ . . . feasible 
precautions (as per Art. 
3(4) CCCW) . . .” 
 Can. 
“ . . . all feasible 
precautions . . .” 
UK 
“ . . . constant care shall be 
taken . . .” 
UK 
“ . . . feasible 
precautions (as per Art. 
3(4) CCCW) . . .” 
UK 
“ . . . where feasible (as 
per Art. 3(4) CCCW) 
. . .” 
UK 
“ . . . least collateral 
damage commensurate 
with military 
success . . .” 
Fra. 
“ . . . constant care shall be 
taken . . .” 
  Fra. 
“ . . . all precautions 
which are practically 
possible . . .” 
  Ger. 
“ . . . where feasible (as 
per Art. 3(4) CCCW) 







“ . . . Must verify objects 
to be attacked . . .” 
Fra. 
“ . . . take all 
precautions . . .” 
 
Ger. 
“ . . . all necessary 
precautions (to spare as far as 
possible) . . .” 
Ger. 
“ . . . shall verify the 
military status of 
target . . .” 
 
 Ger. 
“ . . . shall choose 
means and methods to 
minimize civilian 
harms . . .” 
Figure 1. The IHL Duty to Take Precautions in Attack: State Practice. 
 
Figure 1 identifies that while the language used in national 
doctrine is comparable, some states nevertheless appear to place 
a greater burden upon their troops to ensure DTP compliance. 
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And, once the doctrine which largely repeats the text of the treaty 
is removed, this practice can be distilled one step further—




Measures taken to 
ensure target 
verification . . . ; 
All precautions to 
minimize civilian 
harms where . . . ; 
Use Means or 
Method . . . ; 
Wide Must be reasonable 
in the 
circumstances. 
Reasonable Where it is reasonable 
to do so, [and in 
particular where it is 
consistent with the concepts 
of resource conservation, or 
reasonable availability]. 
Narrow Must be all available 
measures in all 
circumstances. 
Feasible Whenever/ wherever 
possible. 
Figure 2. The Narrow and Wide interpretations of the Duty to Take 
Precautions 
 
To summarize, DTP is irrevocably intertwined with 
distinction and proportionality. Together, the three concepts 
help maintain the delicate balance between humanitarian 
considerations and military necessity. The discussion in Part II has 
centered specifically upon “feasible verification,” and “feasible 
precautions.” To this, one may also add the obligation for the 
targeteer to take constant care, though this also remains subject 
to feasibility.88 Having considered a small sample of state practice, 
the analysis has identified that certain states appear to sway 
towards the military necessity extreme of the IHL spectrum as 
compared to others. This is perhaps most noticeable when 
comparing US practice to that of Germany—for example, a 
German soldier must assess each target before choosing the 
means and method that will minimize civilian harm. The US 
targeteer is actively encouraged to consider the wider mission 
brief. However, regardless of such variations, it is undeniable that 
there will be circumstances where those that possess EAI and AWS 
technology will be legally obligated to use them. A key question 
 
88. See Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 41, at 400-01. 
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that is posed by the current thesis, and one which the following 
section addresses, is what are the conditions under which an EAI 
should refuse an order? 
III. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND DISOBEYING OF ORDERS 
The discussion in Part II identified that the DTP obligation 
can be subdivided into numerous interconnected paths.89 The 
analysis concluded that while a narrow and wide interpretation of 
“feasibility” can be crafted, neither path detracts from the 
certainty that where EAIs are a feasible option, armed-forces will 
be obligated to deploy them. The purpose of Part III is to 
forensically examine the interface between DTP and the state-
based Rules of Engagement (“ROE”).90 Here, specific reference 
is naturally centered on the disobeying of orders. This 
examination is necessary because if nations are to be required to 
utilize EAIs, a key question arises as to whether robots can, and 
should, refuse an order to attack? Similar to the Part II 
examination, Part III first identifies how the obligation to disobey 
orders fits within the corpus of IHL, and in particular within 
DTP.91 This is followed, once again, with an examination of state 
practice in this area. 
A. How does the Duty to Disobey an Order fit within DTP? 
No matter whether AWS as a “means” are realized, unarmed 
AI/EAIs will become a “method” utilized by armed-forces. The 
introduction of increasingly autonomous tech can be seen 
 
89. Indeed, the art. 57 obligations extend further than is considered for the current 
analysis. This includes, for example, a duty to provide an advance warning of an attack, 
where possible [i.e. where feasible] and, to choose the target that leads to lesser civilian 
harms when presented with two or more targets that offer a similar military advantage. 
See API, supra note 20, art. 57 (2)(c)-(3). 
90. For the sake of the present article, the terms “ROE” and “military doctrine” are 
used interchangeably. The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, for 
example states: “ROE [are] directives issued by competent military authority that 
delineate the circumstances and limitation under which US forces will initiate and/or 
continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (“Doctrine” is 




91. How DTP fits within the wider body of IHL has already been examined. 
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throughout industry, and there is no reason to suspect the 
military domain will be any different. For example, a human may 
program an autonomous car with a destination address, but the 
vehicles’ software is responsible for making decisions about which 
turn to either make, or not.92 In the military domain however, the 
task will not always be as straightforward as getting from “A” to 
“B.” But, where deployed, an EAI may have to refuse to order to 
ensure a positive military advantage is balanced with 
humanitarian considerations—but in which circumstances? 
This Section identifies the concept of manifestly unlawful 
orders and the customary duty to disobey one. This duty itself 
must be viewed alongside the fact that a combatant also has a duty 
to follow orders. Indeed, as noted by one commentator,93 from 
1863, Article 44 of Lieber code permitted a commanding officer 
to shoot and kill a subordinate on the spot, should they disobey 
their order to cease committing a crime.94 Today’s soldier may 
not face quite the same fate. However, they may still be subject to 
court martial or imprisonment.95 As a consequence, in the vast 
majority of circumstances (while seemingly at odds with the ICJ’s 
rejection of the “Nuremberg defense”),96 a combatant may rely 
 
92. See PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE 31-32 (W. W. Norton & Co. eds., 1st ed. 2018) 
(identifying the automatic/automated/autonomous spectrum, the author notes: “[a]s 
machines become more sophisticated, they become more capable and able to 
accomplish more complex tasks in more open-ended environments.”). 
93. Gurgen Petrosian, Elements of Superior Responsibility for sexual violence by 
subordinates, 42 MAN. L.J.123, 127 (2019). 
94. General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field art. 44 (Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code] (“a soldier, 
officer or private, in the act of committing such violence, and disobeying a superior 
ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such superior.”). 
95. See, e.g., Armed Forces Act, (2006), art. 12(1) (UK) (“A person subject to service 
law commits an offence if— (a) he disobeys a lawful command; and (b) he intends to 
disobey, or is reckless as to whether he disobeys, the command. (2) A person guilty of an 
offence under this section is liable to any punishment mentioned in the Table in section 
164, but any sentence of imprisonment imposed in respect of the offence must not 
exceed ten years.”). 
96. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (“London 
Agreement”) Aug. 8, 1945, 59. Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (“The fact that the defendant 
acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from 
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal 
determines that justice so requires.”). 
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upon the defense that they were acting in accordance with 
orders.97 
The majority of domestic courts recognize one of three 
variations of this defense: (i) that following orders is always a 
defense; (ii) that following orders is a defense where the 
combatant believed it was a lawful order, and; (iii) that following 
orders is a defense where it would have been reasonable to believe 
that the order was lawful.98 The United States adheres to the latter 
of these three variants, with the passage previously identified 
continuing, “ . . . unless the accused knew the orders to be 
unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would 
have known the orders to be unlawful.”99 According to the second 
and third variants of the “following orders” defense therefore, 
there are circumstances where a soldier either “will” recognize an 
unlawful order, or where they “should” have recognized an 
unlawful order. And this is a customary duty, thus binding upon 
all parties.100 Significantly, this not only means that there are 
limited circumstances under which a combatant can refuse to 
follow an order, but, that in such circumstances “[e]very 
combatant has a duty to disobey a manifestly unlawful order.”101 
Indeed, where the combatant does not fulfil this latter duty, but 
instead carries out a manifestly unlawful order, no “Nuremberg 
defense” can be relied upon, and the subordinate will face 
individual criminal responsibility. This is considered an 
additional customary provision.102 
“Manifestly unlawful,” or “manifestly criminal,” generally 
refers to war crimes. This includes breaches of the IHL principles 
of distinction and proportionality.103 In addition, crimes against 
 
97. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, §916(d) (2016) 
[hereinafter US Courts-Martial Manual] (“It is a defense to any offense that the accused 
was acting pursuant to orders . . .”); see also Keith A. Petty, Duty and Disobedience: The 
Conflict of Conscience and Compliance in the Trump Era, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 55, 103-04 (2018) 
(citing Osiel, supra note 2, at 21 (“Virtually all military codes include some provision on 
due obedience . . . .”)). 
98. See Osiel, supra note 2, at 950; see also Petty, supra note 97, at 103-04. 
99. US Courts-Martial Manual, supra note 97, II-116. 
100. See ICRC Customary Rules, supra note 32, at 563-64. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. at 565 (“Obeying a superior order does not relieve a subordinate of 
criminal responsibility if the subordinate knew that the act ordered was unlawful or 
should have known because of the manifestly unlawful nature of the act ordered.”). 
103. The legal basis of which was considered in Section II.A supra. 
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humanity and crimes against the peace would, in the majority of 
cases, also be considered such.104 In short, a combatant is 
therefore only presumed to know a subset of crimes that are 
“immediately recognizable as manifestly criminal by a person of 
ordinary understanding.”105 Such a limitation may be just, for it is 
questionable whether the law should require armed services 
personnel to carry out their non-civilian duties while 
simultaneously having to conduct a full legal assessment of each 
and every instruction that is handed down to them by a superior. 
Most soldiers are not lawyers and nor should they be required to 
be. Instead, the obligation to obey their superiors is what sets 
combatants apart from civilians.106 
B. Disobeying of Orders 
The following Section examines existing state practice in 
order to identify whether it can help to determine the 
circumstances under which EAI should be programmed to refuse 
an order. It examines the practice of the six states previously 
considered, and extends the analysis to the practice of three 
further nations not widely considered to be leading military 
powers. These additional states are the Philippines, the Republic 
of the Congo (“Congo”), and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (“DRC”). 
Science fiction writer Isaac Asimov’s second law of robotics 
states that, “a robot must obey orders given to it by a human 
 
104. See Petty, supra note 97, at 97 (citing DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE 
ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE FM 27-10 178 (1956) (“[a]lthough this 
manual recognizes the criminal responsibility of individuals for [crimes against peace, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes], members of the armed forces will normally 
be concerned only with those offenses constituting ‘war crimes.’”)). 
105. See Osiel, supra note 2, at 961. Note that the author supports the notion that 
the duty upon a US soldier is only to refuse to follow a manifestly unlawful order. Thus 
the US soldier does not need to exercise “situational judgement.” See Osiel, supra note 
2, at 971. 
106. Note for example, that military doctrine accepts that the “obligation” to follow 
a superior’s orders is what separates members of the armed forces from their civilian 
counterparts. See, e.g., IHL Database –  New Zealand, Practice Relating to Rule 154, ICRC, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_nz_rule154 
[https://perma.cc/VK9D-DYPD] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021) (New Zealand’s Armed 
Conflict Manual states: “[An] obligation, and the one which clearly sets a member of a 
military force apart from his civilian counterparts, is the obligation to obey lawful 
commands of a superior officer.”). 
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except where such orders conflict with the first law.”107 His first 
law is “a robot may not injure a human being, or, through 
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.”108 As the 
Authors have noted elsewhere,109 while these rules allow Asimov 
to cleverly write stories that toy with human-EAI relationships, 
they are utterly inadequate for robots that are programmed 
specifically to apply “deliberate . . . often lethal capabilities in 
order to produce maximum effect upon an enemy.”110 
Instead, the discussion in the previous section identified that 
a soldier has a strict obligation to follow an order, except where 
they have a customary duty to refuse to follow an order. 
Presumably, when advanced EAIs are introduced, this obligation 
would simply be transposed and implemented. However, in 
practice, the types of orders and circumstances under which a 
combatant is expected to refuse an order differ significantly. 
These variations exist because they are contained within 
municipal military doctrine, or Rules of Engagement (“ROE”), as 
opposed to being codified within IHL.111 Somewhat regrettably, 
 
107. See generally ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT 40 (1950). 
108. Id. (Asimov’s 3 laws of robotics state that: “[o]ne, a robot may not injure a 
human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm . . . [t]wo . . . 
a robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would 
conflict with the First Law . . .  [a]nd three . . . a robot must protect its own existence as 
long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws.” 
109. Grimal & Pollard, supra note 26, at 523. 
110. Corn & Schoettler, supra, note 19, at 795. Indeed, as noted in a previous piece, 
it is not unusual for Asimov’s rules to appear in the debate surrounding AWS. Corn & 
Schoettler, supra, note 19, at 795 (citing Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for 
Autonomous Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347, 1372 n.135 (2016)). See also Andrew 
Figueroa, License to Kill: An Analysis of the Legality of Fully Autonomous Drones in the Context 
of International Use of Force Law, 31 PACE INT’L L. REV. 145, 156 n.71 (2018). 
111. Article 77 of a draft version of API did state that “no person shall be punished 
for refusing to obey an order of his government or of a superior which, if carried out, 
would constitute a grave breach of the provisions of the Conventions or of the present 
Protocol.” See CDDH, Official Records, Vol. I, Part Three, Draft Additional Protocols, 
June 1973, at 25. However, as noted by the ICRC, the provision failed to gain the required 
two thirds majority that it needs to pass as law. See ICRC Practice Relating to Customary 
Rules, supra note 52, at 3799-3800; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court  (“Rome Statute”) art. 33(1),  July 17, 1988, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (relating to Superior 
Orders and Prescription of Law, which states: “the fact that a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or 
of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of a criminal 
responsibility unless: (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the 
Government or the superior in question; (b) The person did not know that the order 
was unlawful; and (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.”). 
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this means that while the members of certain armed forces may 
make a subjective determination as to which orders should be 
disobeyed, others may do so only objectively.112 This is concerning 
because the Authors support the view that EAI, and AWS can 
increase adherence to international law. For example, EAIs will 
operate while simultaneously processing vast amounts of 
preprogrammed information, including unabridged IHL 
databases. Moreover, they will do so while remaining unaffected 
by the threats and pressures that are typically associated with 
armed conflict. However, while autonomous technology in 
general can offer an opportunity to ensure the duty to disobey a 
superior order is applied equally, the current variation in state 
practice is likely to be reflected as somewhat of a national bias 
when programming EAIs and other such technologies. 
In the United States, ROE generally identify that a 
combatant must distinguish only between lawful and unlawful 
orders (the latter of which must be disobeyed).113 In this instance 
US doctrine appears to support a “narrow” interpretation. This is 
consistent with the concept of “manifest unlawfulness” that is 
recognized, for example, by the ICRC.114 UK doctrine adopts a 
similar stance, stating “[m]ilitary personnel are required to obey 
lawful commands but must not obey unlawful commands.”115 And 
similarly, Philippine doctrine states “[a]nyone who shall refuse or 
fail to carry out a lawful order from the military chain of 
command shall be subject to military discipline.”116 
 
112. Having identified that following an instruction would lead to the commission 
of a “manifestly” criminal act. 
113. See, e.g., ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3804 
(“[m]embers of the armed forces are bound to obey only lawful orders”) (citing U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE AIRFORCE , INTERNATIONAL LAW – THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND 
AIR OPERATIONS, PAMPHLET 110-31 §15-4(d) (1976)); see also HEADQUARTERS DEP’T OF 
THE ARMY, YOUR CONDUCT IN COMBAT UNDER THE LAW OF WAR, PUBLICATION FIELD 
MANUAL NO. 27-2 26 (1984) (“although you are responsible for promptly obeying all 
legal orders issued by your leader, you are obligated to disobey an order to commit a 
crime.”). 
114. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3799-3814. See 
also Rome Statute, supra note 104, art. 33(1). The existing standard is one of “manifest” 
unlawfulness. Id. 
115. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52 (citing MINISTRY OF 
DEFENCE, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, D/DAT/13/35/66, ARMY CODE 71130 46, 
Annex A § 2).  
116. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3803 (citing 
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CODE OF ETHICS 16-17 (1991)). 
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Though only subtly different, some states adopt a slightly 
wider approach. French ROE, for example, identifies the sources 
of law that should inform a decision whether to disobey an order, 
these being, “the customs of war . . . [and] . . . the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflicts, or duly ratified or 
approved international treaties.”117 Analogously, and offering 
guidance as what to do where an order is ambiguous, Australian 
doctrine supplies, “clarification should be sought. If clarification 
is unavailable, any action taken must comply with LOAC [Law of 
Armed Conflict].”118 And, similarly, Congolese doctrine states 
“the subordinate must not execute an order to commit an act 
manifestly . . . contrary to the customs of war and to the 
international conventions.”119 
The obligations contained within German, DRC, and 
Canadian doctrine must, however, be considered wide. This is 
because while each appears to be aligned with the standard of 
manifest unlawfulness,120 the guidance that each state supplies to 
its combatants is significantly more conceptual than that which is 
offered to the armed forces of states such as the United States, 
and the United Kingdom. For example, the DRC Constitution 
provides, 
No one is required to execute a manifestly illegal order. Every 
individual, every State agent is relieved from the duty to obey, 
when an order received constitutes a manifest infringement 
 
117. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3802 (citing 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS AS AMENDED art. 8(3) (1975)). 
118. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3800 (citing 
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, ADFT 37 – INTERIM EDITION § 1306); see also AUSTRALIAN 
DEFENCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 06.4, supra note 70, at § 13.7. 
119. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3802 (Décret No. 
86/057 du 14 janvier 1986 portant Règlement du Service dans l’Armée Populaire 
Nationale, 1986). 
120. See Code of Conduct for CF Personnel (Can.), supra note 75, Rule 11, § 4 (“in 
accordance with military custom you should . . . obey and execute the order—unless—
the order is manifestly unlawful”); see also Congo (Democratic Republic of the)’s Constitution 
of 2005 with Amendments through 2011, CONSTITUTE PROJECT, art. 28, 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_
2011.pdf?lang=en [https://perma.cc/6DTL-9KF6] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021) 
[hereinafter DRC Constitution of the Transition] (“No one is required to execute a 
manifestly illegal order.”); ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 50, at 
3802 (citing GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICTS §§ 144-145). It is expressly prohibited to obey orders whose execution would 
be a crime.  
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of the respect of the rights of man and of the public freedoms 
and of morality.121 
This clearly goes further than identifying breaches of IHL, 
LOAC, or International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”).122 
Moreover, the obligation to apply a moral perspective when 
considering manifest unlawfulness casts the net much farther 
than the seemingly straightforward lawful or unlawful assessment 
that the narrow interpretation requires. In addition, while 
Canadian doctrine mirrors the Australian position regarding 
clarification,123 it also identifies a manifestly unlawful act as one 
which “shocks the conscience of every reasonable, right-thinking 
person.”124 While this is perhaps not quite as abstract as the DRC 
guidance, it nevertheless provides a wide scope of assessment. 
The final doctrine considered in this area is that of Germany. 
Germany’s interpretation of the customary duty to disobey an 
unlawful order is arguably wider than that of its peers due to its 
historical requirement for unconditional obedience to military 
orders.125 As a result, current German doctrine identifies that its 
soldiers should not execute an order if: 
. . . it violates the human dignity of the third party concerned 
or the recipient of the order; it is not of any use for service; 
 
121. See DRC Constitution of the Transition, supra note 120, art. 28. 
122. See 1996 I.C.J 226, supra note 27, ¶ 25. While International Human Rights Law 
is applicable in armed conflict, IHL must take precedence where there is a conflict due 
to the concept of lex specialis. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 27, ¶¶ 89-92; Marko Milanovic, 
The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship Between Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT & 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Jens. D. Ohlin ed., 2014). 
123. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3800 (Code of 
Conduct for CF Personnel, Rule 11, § 4 (Can.)). 
124. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3801-02 (citing 
Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Rule 11, § 5 (Can.), which continues with the 
examples that: mistreating someone who has surrendered or beating a detainee is 
manifestly unlawful, though this is not, of course, intended to be exhaustive). 
125. For a useful discussion, see Erin Blakemore, Why German Soldiers Don’t Have to 
Obey Orders, HISTORY (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.history.com/news/why-german-
soldiers-dont-have-to-obey-orders [https://perma.cc/JGJ2-3BD2]; Blakemore notes, for 
example, that from August 1934, German soldiers swore an oath not to the state, but the 
Fuehrer himself. See Adolf Hitler: The Fuehrer Oath, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-fuehrer-oath [https://perma.cc/YCA6-Y9H3] 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2021) (providing the translation: “I swear by almighty God this 
sacred oath: I will render unconditional obedience to the Fuehrer of the German Reich 
and people, Adolf Hitler, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and, as a brave 
soldier, I will be ready at any time to stake my life for this oath.”). 
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or in a definite situation, the soldier cannot reasonably be 
expected to execute it. 126 
This is significantly wider than the obligation to not carry out 
an unlawful, or manifestly unlawful, order. Indeed, a German 
combatant must consider not only the lawfulness of the order, but 
their own “dignity,” and that of the targeted.127 If that were not 
considerably “wide” enough, a German combatant must also 
consider whether, in the circumstances, there is a reasonable 
chance of mission success, or whether the order serves the 
“defense of Germany . . . [or] . . . the pursuit or achievement of 
its political or economic aims.”128 Consequently, it appears a 
German soldier should evaluate the reasoning behind each 
command. Clearly there is a significant variation in state practice 
in this area. Once again, three primary tracks come to the fore. 

















126. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3802 (citing 
GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 
MANUAL § 142). 
127. Blakemore, supra note 125. 
128. Ilja Baudisch, Freedom of Conscience and Right to Conscientious Objection - Refusal 
to Obey to Military Orders - Legal Ban on the Use of Force (Article 2(4) UN Charter) - Neutrality 
of States in Armed Conflicts, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 911, 912 (2006). For a similar, but perhaps 
a more convivial discussion, see John Ford, When Can a Soldier Disobey an Order?, WAR ON 
ROCKS (July 24, 2017), https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/when-can-a-soldier-
disobey-an-order/ [https://perma.cc/B9WZ-9TNX]. 
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 Disobeying Orders 
A soldier has a strict obligation to follow an 
order, and to do so is a defense (three 
variants): 
(i) Always;  
(ii) Where they believed it was a lawful order, 
or  
(iii) Where they should have known it was an 
unlawful order . . . (see ICRC Rule 155) 
Therefore, there is a duty to follow an order, 
except where there is a customary duty to 
refuse (ICRC Rule 154). 
State practice relating to the circumstances 
in which a soldier should therefore refuse to 





US “ . . . must distinguish between lawful and 
unlawful . . .” 
UK “ . . . obey only lawful commands . . .” 
Phi. “ . . . must carry out a lawful order . . .” 
 Aus. “ . . . Seek clarification if ambiguous, or 





Can. “ . . . manifestly unlawful means it would 
shock the conscience of every right-thinking 
person . . .” 
Fra. “ . . . the customs of war . . . LOAC . . . duly 
ratified or approved international treaties . . .” 
Con. “ . . . manifestly contrary to customs of war 





Ger. “ . . . if it violates human dignity (of first 
and third party), if the order is of no use to service, 
of if soldier cannot reasonably be expected to 
execute it . . .” 
DRC. “ . . . can disobey an order if it is a manifest 
violation of human rights, of public liberties and 
morals . . .” 
Figure 3. The Duty to Disobey an Order: State Practice. 
704 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:3 
While some may posit that the discrepancies noted in Part II 
are arguably a matter of semantics, the result of the disparities 
between the narrow and wide variants of the duty to disobey an 
order are often stark. For instance, US military courts have 
consistently refused to recognize that the obligation to refuse to 
follow a unlawful order is applicable to the decision to wage 
war.129 As a result, First Lieutenant Watada, who refused to deploy 
to Iraq in 2006 because he believed the war was unlawful—and 
therefore, that any order he would receive there would also be—
failed to convince the court to that effect.130 While he escaped a 
charge for insubordination, ultimately, he left military service 
with “an ‘other than honorable’ characterization of service—the 
worst administrative discharge . . . an officer can receive.”131 This 
was the case even though applicable US doctrine stated “an 
essential foundation for Army leaders is a character ‘comprised 
of a person’s moral and ethical qualities [which] helps to 
determine what is right . . . regardless of circumstances or 
consequences.’”132 
In contrast, in 2005, the German Federal Administrative 
court (Germany has no military courts) had to consider very 
similar facts. In the Limits of Obedience to Superior Orders case the 
court considered a German Major who had refused to take part 
in a NATO information technology project that would potentially 
 
129. See United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. 105, 114 (C.A.A.F.1995); Watada v. 
Head, No. C07-5549BHS, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 88489, at 8-10 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 2008); 
ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 50. Petty, supra note 97, at 100-
01. 
130. See Ford, supra note 128 (“A few servicemembers have tried unsuccessfully to 
disobey orders to deploy in support of these operations. In 2006, 1st Lt. Ehren Watanda 
refused to deploy to Iraq because he believed the war was illegal. His arguments fell on 
unsympathetic ears. In fact, Watanda was not even permitted to present his preferred 
defense because [t]he order to deploy soldiers is a non-justiciable political question . . . 
an accused may not excuse his disobedience of an order to proceed to foreign duty on 
the ground that our presence there does not conform to his notions of legality.”); see also 
Murdoch, supra note 2, at 6-8; Petty, supra note 97, at 100-01. 
131. Petty, supra note 97, at 101 (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Regulation 600-8-24, 
Officer Transfers and Discharges, 6 (Sept. 13, 2011), 
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN3140_AR600-8-
24_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGM4-MQEL]). 
132. See Petty, supra note 97, at 129 (citing DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE 
REFERENCE PUBLICATION 6-22, ARMY LEADERSHIP  ¶ 3-1 (Aug. 1, 2012)). 
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support Operation Iraqi Freedom.133 Similar to Watada, the 
Major believed that the conflict in Iraq was unlawful.134 The 
decision in the German court however, is the antithesis of 
Watada—the court upheld the claim of the Major, and acquitted 
him of the charge.135 It did so because having considered that the 
lawfulness of the war was indeed questionable, the court held the 
Major could rely upon his fundamental right of freedom of 
conscience under German Basic law.136 Consequently, he was 
permitted to seek, and to be assigned, an alternative task.137 This 
is an important decision because it reaffirmed that under German 
law the duty to obey orders “does not demand blind or 
unconditional devotion to superiors.”138 However, perhaps most 
notably, the decision also noted that a German combatant should 
not be made to act against their moral or ethical convictions.139 
These two similar but contrasting cases provide a 
fundamental example of the differences between what the 
 
133. See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [German Federal Administrative Court] June 
21, 2005, 120 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1455 (Ger.) (known also as, Limits of Obedience 
to Superior Orders Case (2005)). For a useful English Language translation of the relevant 
paragraphs of the judgement, see Germany: Practice Relating to Rule 154; Obedience to 
Superior Orders, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_de_rule154 [https://perma.cc/VHP4-A7Q9] (last visited Feb. 18, 
2021). 
134. See Baudisch, supra note 128, at 911. 
135. Baudisch, supra note 128, at 911. 
136. Note that at ¶ 4.1.2.1 the German court states that “human dignity” also 
includes the protection of the freedom of conscience according to Article 4, ¶ 1 of the 
Basic Law. In any case, it does not reduce that protection. Translating ICRC Practice 
Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 154. See also Baudisch, supra note 128, at 
911-12 n.2, 5 (citing Article 4 of The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz): “freedom of faith 
and conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed, shall be 
inviolable . . . (3) No person shall be compelled against his conscience to render military 
service involving the use of arms. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.”). 
137. See Baudisch, supra note 128, at 914; see also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, 
Practice Relating to Rule 154. Obedience to Superior Orders, ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE 
(2005), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/cihlweb.nsf/DocIndex/v2_cou_de_rule154?OpenDocu
ment&Click=  [https://perma.cc/6XMT-PVAK] [hereinafter ICRC Database Rule 154]. 
138. See ICRC Database Rule 154, supra note 137; see also Baudisch, supra note 128, 
at 911. 
139. ICRC Database Rule 154, supra note 137, ¶ 4.1.3.1.1 (“a soldier . . . has to act 
with all the diligence and responsibility possible to him and has to act accordingly. An 
“unconditioned” or “unconditional” obedience is not compatible with this normative 
imperative. Requested is rather a “thinking” obedience, an obedience “reflecting” the 
consequences of carrying out the order—especially also with regard to the limits of the 
applicable law and the ethical “yardsticks” of the personal conscience.”).  
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Authors identify as the narrow and wide obligations. However, it 
is not necessarily a novel or a ground-breaking discussion.140 What 
it does highlight for the sake of the present Article, is that in all 
but the most incontrovertible of circumstances,141 a combatant 
can never be sure that their decision to disobey an order will be 
supported. While the reasons to disobey an order may include 
self-preservation, preventing breaches of IHL, or the commission 
of war-crimes,142 other factors, including political143 and financial 
pressures,144 warrior training, a sense of patriotism, group 
solidarity, the fear of being branded a coward by one’s peers,145 
and the potential for court-martial or criminal charges, might 
cause any reasonable person to hesitate before doing so. 
Many of those persuasive factors could be removed if an EAI 
was tasked with making an objective determination. For example, 
if three primary reasons for refusing an order are: (i) deterring a 
perceived wrong; (ii) exercising a freedom of conscience, and; 
(iii) avoiding self-harm,146 it is arguable that only the first is 
applicable to a machine. However, a machine can still support a 
human in respect of the other two. For example, an EAI could 
analyze an order and guide a human decision-maker accordingly, 
 
140. See generally Osiel, supra note 2; Paola Gaeta, The Defence of Superior Orders: The 
Statute of the International Criminal Court versus Customary International Law, EJIL 172, 172-
91 (1999); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF ‘OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS’ 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). The Authors also note that the latter two discussions are 
focused more upon the jus ad bellum, than they are in the jus in bello, which is the intended 
subject matter of the present article. Nevertheless, they do provide an obvious and clear 
example of a narrow and wide obligation. 
141. For example, an order to commit genocide, or torture. 
142. For example, torture, sexual violence and mistreatment of POWs. 
143. Higher ranking members of the armed forces may be particularly aware of a 
need to consider the current political environment. Consider, for example, the Captain 
of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, Brett Crozier, who was recently removed from his 
position, and looks set to face charges for failing to respect the chain of command. See 
Bradley Peniston, Navy to Punish Fired Captain of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, DEF. ONE 
(June 19, 2020), https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/06/navy-punish-fired-uss-
roosevelt-captain/166300/ [https://perma.cc/RC7B-7R5Z]. 
144. There may also be financial implications if a combatant was to have a criminal 
conviction imposed upon them, as this may prevent them from gaining further 
employment. See id. 
145. See Petty, supra note 97, at 128 (citing Carl Ficarrotta, Selective Conscientious 
Objection: Some Guidelines for Implementation, in WHEN SOLDIERS SAY NO: SELECTIVE 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE MODERN MILITARY 197, 199 (Andrea Ellner et al. eds., 
2016); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 55-57 (Peter Crane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994)). 
146. Petty, supra note 97, at 109. 
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or even take action to prevent an order that was given mistakenly 
or maliciously. 
For the sake of the examination in the following section, the 
state practice that has been considered thus far can now be 
distilled into three tracks. These are: 
 
 Adherence to DTP, and Influencing Factors for 
Disobeying Superior Orders 
Track 1 Every soldier should take all reasonable precautions to 
verify targets as military objects, and should take all 
reasonable steps to minimize civilian harms. In choosing 
the means and methods of attack, the decision-maker 
should consider their reasonable availability, with a 
specific regard for the wider mission objectives. A soldier 
must only refuse to follow an order where they know, or 
should know, that it is a manifestly unlawful order. 
Track 2 Every soldier should take all steps to ensure target 
verification and the minimization of civilian harms, 
where they are practicable or practically possible. The 
soldier should take into account the circumstances ruling 
at the time, including humanitarian and military 
considerations. In doing so, the decision-maker must 
consider all of the customs of war and applicable 
international treaties, and refuse to follow any order 
which would be in breach of them.  
Track 3 Every soldier must take all necessary precautions to 
ensure a target is verified, and in each case, must choose 
the means and methods that ensures civilian harms are 
minimized. The factors which should influence the 
decision to refuse to follow an order include, but are not 
necessarily limited to: the lawfulness of the order; 
whether following the order would violate the human 
dignity of the first or third party (including personal 
moral and ethical standards); whether there is a 
reasonable chance of mission success; and whether the 
order is consistent with national policy/strategy.  
Figure 4. The Three Interpretive Tracks. 
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Naturally, each of these are themselves subject to some level 
of fluidity with regard to interpretation. This is particularly true 
of the central/ treaty-based track, which could either be heavily 
weighted toward the narrow or the wide variant. Nevertheless, for 
the sake of examination in Part IV, these provide an adequate 
point of reference. 
To summarize, Part III has shown that the minimum 
standard (reflected by the narrow obligation) requires that a 
soldier has an obligation to follow an order, except where the 
customary duty requires for them to refuse. Nevertheless, a gray 
area exists because certain state practice suggests that the 
customary obligation to refuse an order extends further than 
merely distinguishing between lawful and unlawful orders. 
Indeed, for some states, a soldier must exhibit high levels of 
“situational awareness” and determine whether the order should 
be followed in light of many varied considerations.147 The 
question posed in the following Section however, is which of the 
three tracks identified in Figure 4 is the most suitable for 
programming EAIs? 
IV. DISOBEDIENCE AND NUCLEAR LAUNCH 
This Part begins by introducing the Authors’ proposed 
“test,” or, the Robot Rules of Engagement (“RROE”). As 
previously noted, in this instance the RROE are tailored to 
address the concept of “refusal.” The test is based upon a “system 
of systems” approach, where each system represents an individual 
task undertaken by an EAI. Once these RROE are established, 
Part IV goes on to consider a number of tangible scenarios to 
determine how the RROE might operate in practice. The fourth 
and final of the envisaged scenarios is the instance of an EAI 
questioning the human decision of nuclear launch. Currently, an 
order for nuclear launch goes simultaneously to both central 
command and the team in the field, making recall difficult.148 
 
147. Whether the order is consistent with the concept of human dignity, human 
rights, public liberties, morals, the conscience of reasonable people, and even whether 
the order is of service to the state (which might be referred to as being consistent with 
policy), and finally, whether the soldier has a reasonable chance of executing the order 
successfully (reflected by the wide obligation). 
148. See GRAY, supra note 3. At least strategically speaking, a nuclear strike with a 
single warhead would in many cases be unwise. The point is, that if an ambiguous, or 
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Indeed, there could be the curious case of one part of the launch 
team wishing to disobey the order to launch, but because that 
original message goes to both, recall and override is no longer 
possible. 
A. Additional Test for Safeguarding Decision-making. 
Before moving on to consider the scenarios, this Section 
introduces the RROE. In short, this “test” calculates human error 
in order to prevent certain orders from being carried out. This 
has the effect of reducing Clauzewitizian friction, though the 
Authors acknowledge that it cannot do so all of the time. The EAI 
examination of orders is seen as an “additional” way for ensuring 
DTP obligations are met. The RROE are grounded in the 
discussion in Parts II and III of this analysis, and in particular to 
the three obligations identified in Figure 4. For the reasons in the 
following paragraphs, the RROE take elements from all three 
tracks. This is for a variety of reasons, but not least because, as 
previously noted, the central premise of IHL is to provide a system 
of “checks and balances . . . aimed at minimizing human suffering 
without undermining the effectiveness of military operations.”149 
IHL is therefore, a compromise,150 and any usable test cannot be 
weighted too heavily upon one concept or the other.151 
With that in mind, Track 1 is considered to be too strict for 
the following reasons. First, excessive weight should not be given 
to the wider mission objectives, and certainly not at the sacrifice 
of humanitarian considerations. Although the Authors agree that 
a soldier should be aware of the means and methods at their 
disposal, and the likelihood of needing to utilize them in the 
future to give them better effect (humanitarianly and militarily), 
each analysis should nevertheless attempt to minimize civilian 
harms where practicable or practically possible. This is arguably a 
 
erroneous order was sent to a large number of launch sites, it would clearly be more 
difficult to prevent launch at several sites (if that was the desired course of action), than 
if an order that was sent to a single location. 
149. DINSTEIN, supra, note 23, at 9. 
150. Id. at 10. 
151. Id. ¶ 9 (“[i]f military necessity were the sole beacon to guide the path of armed 
forces in wartime, no meaningful constraints would have been imposed on the freedom 
of action of Belligerent Parties . . . [but] . . . [i]f benevolent humanitarianism were the 
only factor to be weighed in hostilities, war would have entailed no bloodshed, no human 
suffering and no destruction of property; in short, war would not be war.”). 
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stricter application than to do so only where there is a reasonable 
availability, and with specific regard for the wider mission 
objectives.152 EAIs will be capable of effectively determining 
whether the order is lawful, but also whether it is consistent with 
the political and strategic doctrine that is contained within ROEs. 
These often impose greater restrictions than IHL alone requires, 
153 and may help to ascertain whether an order is of “use for service” 
as is required, for example, by German doctrine.154  If these more 
“precise” guidelines are programmed into an EAI, they help to 
identify when an order should be refused, for example, because 
it was provided by an individual acting out of revenge.155 
Nevertheless, an entirely Track 3-based approach is also 
unsuitable. In the first instance, this is because a soldier must have 
at least some regard to the wider mission objectives. For example, 
an infantryman might carry two grenades—one non-autonomous 
and the other a form of AWS capable of independently carrying 
out proportionality assessments before detonating. Given this 
scenario, a combatant may wish to reserve the latter weapon with 
the knowledge that they were about to enter a more densely 
populated locality where the advanced tech might help to save 
civilian lives. However, strict adherence to Track 3 would prevent 
 
152. In addition, due to the fact that when programmed to carry out a specific task, 
EAIs will not “forget.” However, this is not always the case when an EAI or AI is 
“repurposed.” As is discussed in the following Section, for example, one of the difficulties 
that AI experts currently face, is that when a self-learning system is given a new task, i.e., 
learning to play the ancient Chinese strategy game “Go,” instead of the one it has been 
playing, i.e., Chess, the system, placing all of its “attention” upon the former, forgets how 
to play the latter. The concept is referred to as catastrophic forgetting. See Anthony 
Robins, Catastrophic Forgetting, Rehearsal, and Pseudorehearsal, 7 CONNECTION SCI.: J. 
NEURAL COMPUTING, A.I. & COGNITIVE RSCH. 123, 123-46 (1995).  
153. Corn & Schoettler, supra note 19, at 821-22. Indeed, future ROE are likely to 
contain vital information on joint-force tactics and operation procedures regarding the 
introduction of AI, and how it will affect all services, across all domains. See also Modern 
War Inst. Podcast, Competition, Conflict, and the Future of Irregular Warfare, MODERN WAR 
INST. (July 22, 2020), https://mwi.usma.edu/mwi-podcast-competition-conflict-and-the-
future-of-irregular-warfare/ [https://perma.cc/G989-CCN9].  
154. ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3802 (citing 
GERMAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ET AL., HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 
MANUAL § 142). 
155. This might be, for example, where an EAI identified that an order was legal, 
but was otherwise inconsistent with ROE regarding certain targets. See Corn & Schoettler, 
supra, note 19, at 822 (noting, for example, that ROEs commonly reflect policy that 
imposes “restrictions on combat power above and beyond LOAC . . . [and that] . . . are 
often adopted in hopes of avoiding alienation of the civilian population.”). 
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this.  Track 3 also fails to satisfy, because the obligations it carries 
are excessively conceptual.156 For example, the ICJ provides that 
Human Dignity is “[t]he essence of the whole corpus of IHL as 
well as human rights law . . . .”157 Nonetheless, as an independent 
concept, human dignity is undefined, and unquantifiable. The 
German court cited the right to freedom of conscience under 
German Basic law as a dignity “enabler.”158 Nonetheless, the 
concept of human dignity must go much deeper than that. 
Indeed, as posited by one author, a good deal of “contemporary 
ideas about the role of international law are grounded on a very 
misplaced notion of what human dignity is.”159 
An in-depth investigation into this matter is well beyond the 
scope of the present Article. However, the Authors believe that it 
would be particularly problematic to include this element of the 
EAI obligation for two primary reasons. Although somewhat 
controversial, the first of these is that both objects and people can 
ultimately be assigned values. They can, therefore, be expressed 
or measured as a quantity and transferred into programmable 
code. Indeed, this would have to be the case if machines were ever 
to successfully carry out distinction and proportionality 
assessments.160 This would be very difficult to achieve with a 
conceptual provision such as human dignity. Nonetheless, the 
overriding issue here is not that it would be a difficult to “upload” 
the concept, but that “[w]ar itself takes a toll on human dignity 
through the intentional sacrificing of lives to achieve military 
objectives.”161 In other words, war is undignified. 
 
156. Though one might argue that if a machine was able to display the “nuanced 
reasoning” that is discussed, for example by Krupiy, supra note 13, it could potentially 
apply Track 3. See infra note 162 (discussing the possibility of introducing an ethical 
governor). 
157. ICTY Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T,¶ 183 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
158. See Limits of Obedience to Superior Orders Case (2005).  
159. Jeremy Rabkin, What We Can Learn about Human Dignity from International Law, 
27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 146 (2003). 
160. See, e.g., Sassoli, supra note 18, at 327 (“A robot must be able to sense all the 
necessary information in order to distinguish between targets in the same manner as a 
person.”). 
161. Adam Saxton, (Un)Dignified Killer Robots?: The Problem with the Human Dignity 
Argument, LAWFARE (Mar. 20, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/undignified-killer-
robots-problem-human-dignity-argument [https://perma.cc/5U77-XQRY]. 
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Consequently, the Authors propose the RROE need to have 
particular regard to IHL, and to the relevant ROE. Future 
doctrine will almost certainly cater for EAI, including the 
circumstances in which they should (or should not) be used. In 
short, used correctly, military doctrine will provide a vital and 
detailed EAI modus operandi that will guide decision-makers, and 
ensure IHL compliance. Moreover, doctrine can be, and in many 
cases is, written with due regard to human dignity—or a wider 
ethical viewpoint—which ensures these are not simply tossed 
aside.162 
The benefit of running orders through a wider set of 
obligations than IHL alone, is that in many cases an EAI will be 
able to correctly determine whether an order is legally compliant, 
whether it is consistent with matters of national policy, and, 
consequently, whether the order is best practice given the 
circumstances.163 In addition, it can help to determine whether 
an order-giver is motivated by something other than a legitimate 
military reason, such as revenge or fear. Consequently, an EAI 
applying this analysis will be able to go much further than merely 
identifying orders which shock the conscience of every 
reasonable, right-thinking person,164 or, of which a person of 
reasonable standing should have known was an unlawful order. A 
military EAI system can, and should, in other words, operate as 
though it was a military lawyer. 
As a solution, the Authors propose the following: The RROE 
should include a number of “systems” which constantly analyze 
the status of an order.  System 1 of this “system-of-systems”: an 
authentication step. This is a vital phase, that is particularly 
relevant when an order is received in the form of code (cyber), 
 
162. Although the current authors do not intend to support the current discussion 
on such a believe, one author suggests it will one day be possible to programme future 
EAIs with an “ethical governor,” which will allow for them to display moral judgement 
when making decisions. See RONAL ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOUR IN 
AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS (2009). 
163. The point here is that the greater protection that is offered by ROE is typically 
subject to policy. See, e.g., Corn & Schoettler, supra, note 19, at 822 (arguing that “a ROE-
based decision to forgo an attack, even if motivated by an effort to mitigate civilian risk, 
is not legally mandated. This fact is an important aspect of contemporary military 
operations, and the difference between legal and policy-based courses of action should 
be constantly emphasized.”). 
164. See ICRC Practice Relating to Customary Rules, supra note 52, at 3800 (citing 
Canadian Code of Conduct §5, Rule 11 (2001)).  
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or where the EAI monitoring the order is doing so remotely. 
Where System 1 fails to authenticate an order, System 4A is 
engaged: this System requires one of three suitable responses: (I) 
inform the order-giver of the observation, and allow a similar 
order to be given (“Passive Refusal”); (II) immediately reject the 
order, but allow similar orders to be given (“Active Refusal”); or 
(III) immediately reject the order and put safeguards in place to 
prevent similar orders being issued (“Preventative Refusal”). 
Perhaps the most likely step in the first instance would be to 
refuse and seek further clarification. This is therefore, active 
refusal.  However, this might be affected by a number of factors, 
not least an order’s gravitas. 
Where an order is authenticated, System 2 is engaged. This 
is comprised of three independent micro-systems—with each of 
them being assigned a fundamental IHL calculation. System A 
runs a continuous distinction assessment, System B is a 
continuous dynamic proportionality assessment, while System C 
analyses whether all practicable or practically possible 
precautions have been taken to minimize civilian harms. Where 
one or all of these micro-systems identify that the continuation to 
follow the order would breach IHL, System 4A is engaged. This 
is, of course, subject to options noted above. In certain instances, 
a System 1 and 2 assessment will be sufficient. However, once a 
System 2 analysis is complete, and there is no cause to intercept 
the order, System 3 would engage (while noting that System 3 
continuously cross-references Systems 1 and 2 one and two—
which also run a continuous assessment loop).  
Once System 3 is engaged, an order is considered subject to 
the criteria previously identified —i.e., according to LOAC,165 
IHRL, other relevant treaties (including regional agreements), 
and national doctrine.166 And, it is this examination that will 
 
165. Which would, of course include the other obligations contained within Article 
57 API, such as the obligation to attack the target that will cause the least amount civilian 
harms in instances where two or more targets offer a similar military advantage. Though 
a nation may have to be party to the treaty if the provision is not considered customary 
in nature. See, e.g., SCHARRE, supra note 92, at 50-51. 
166. The latter of which is likely to include information regarding the 
interpretation of IHL. See Corn & Schoettler, supra, note 19, at 822 (identifying, for 
example, that the U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL 241 (2015) states that 
the United States does not consider Article 57(3) API to be customary in nature). In 
addition, and by way of offering a caveat, while the Authors have proposed that the test 
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determine whether the instruction is consistent with this wide 
body of obligations, and/or, whether it is beset, for example, with 
motivation for revenge, self-preservation, or the commission of a 
war crime. Depending upon the type of order—i.e., whether it 
contains a single instruction or multiple instructions—this may 
be repeated on a perpetual loop. Where there is cause to 
intercept the order, System 3 will engage System 4A, subject to 
the caveats previously considered. However, where there is no 
grounds to intercept an order, System 4B is engaged. This final 
stage either completes or implements the order, or repeats the 
entire assessment so long as necessary to allow for completion. 

























should carry certain boundaries, in practice any nation choosing to apply such a test 
would do so according to which ever model suited their particular state practice—this 
could be more akin to either the narrow or the wide model previously identified. 
2021] SHOULD ROBOTS REFUSE? 715 





































 Initial action: EAI monitoring system (means or method) deployed/utilized either through tactical 
choice, or through necessity due to adherence with Article 57 API obligations.  
EAI System 1 - Assessment 
 
Can order given to EAI be authenticated? If no, systematic refusal subject to System 4A. If yes, 
consider System 4B, and; 
EAI System 2 - Assessment (Continuous loop) 
 
System A = Distinction. Is target a legitimate military target? (Feasible verification). If no, 
systematic refusal subject to System 4A. If yes, consider System 4B, and; 
 
System B = Proportionality. Is the value of the target excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated? If no, systematic refusal subject to System 4A. If yes, 
consider System 4B, and;  
 
System C =  Duty to take precautions. In the circumstances, have all practicable or practically 
possible precautions be taken to minimize civilian harms? If no, systematic refusal subject to 
System 4A. If yes, consider System 4B and;  
EAI System 3 - Assessment (Continuous loop) 
 
Does the order adhere to all customs of war, applicable treaty provisions, and relevant military 
manuals? If no, systematic refusal subject to System 4A. If yes, apply System 4B(i), or 4B(ii) as 
System 4A - Systematic Refusal 
 
In the circumstances, should the System; 
 (i) inform the order-giver of the observation, 
and allow a similar order to be given (Passive 
Refusal);   
(ii) immediately reject the order, but allow 
similar orders (Active Refusal), or  
(iii), immediately reject the order and put 
safeguards in place to prevent similar orders 
being issued (Preventative Refusal)? 
System 4B – Follow Order/ Re-run 
Assessment 
 
(i) Do not intercept the order and allow 
completion, or 
(ii) Do not intercept order, but continue and/ 
or re-run assessment as required.    
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B. Scenario 1 
With reference to Figure 5 above, the following Section 
considers a number of scenarios to see how the RROE might 
apply to various orders. This analysis begins with the following 
scenario, which intends to demonstrate how existing, often 
rudimentary technology, lacks the ability to apply “post-human 
assessment.” An anti-personnel mine is an example that often 
appears in the conversation surrounding AWS, and it can also 
provide an ideal point of focus here.167 Existing references to anti-
personnel mines commonly highlight the fact that once in 
position there is no further human involvement. In essence, the 
weapon displays a basic level of autonomy, “deciding” itself when 
force should be applied. The “decision” to detonate (or not), is 
based entirely upon whether a pressure threshold is surpassed 
when an individual steps on the pressure plate or when the trip 
wire is snagged.168 In the case of an anti-personnel mine therefore 
(regardless of any basic autonomy of the weapon itself), a human 
will make decisions as to whether its use is an appropriate means 
or method, whether it is otherwise lawful,169 and that deploying 
the munition in a certain way is identified as acceptable 
 
167. See, e.g., SCHARRE, supra note 92, at 50-51. 
168. See, e.g., Kevin Bonsor, How Landmines Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
https://science.howstuffworks.com/landmine.htm [https://perma.cc/UY3Y-RV87] 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2020).  
169. According to all relevant legal provisions, including in particular: the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (“Ottawa Treaty”) Mar. 1, 1999, 2056 U.N.T.S. 
211; Protocol II, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or 
to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Dec. 3, 1998, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93; ICRC Customary Rules, 
supra note 32 (citing ICRC Customary Rule 81: “[w]hen landmines are used, particular 
care must be taken to minimize their indiscriminate effects . . . State practice establishes 
this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and 
non-international armed conflicts. This rule applies to the use of anti-vehicle mines. It 
also applies in relation to anti-personnel landmines for States which have not yet adopted 
a total ban on their use.”). 
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practice.170 In fact, this is true of nearly all existing munitions.171 
While an anti-personnel mine could be considered a “basic” EAI, 
there is no method for the robot to “refuse” to detonate. 
C. Scenario 2 
While Scenario 1 identified that “basic” autonomy has no 
real choice in terms of refusing an order, this second scenario 
considers more advanced technology. Here, particular emphasis 
is placed upon weapons platforms. Indeed, most militaries 
currently deploy rudimentary EAI platforms—many of them with 
various AI systems on-board. Radar, for example, and other such 
detection systems, enable the modern-day fighter jet to 
independently identify potential threats, “lock on,” and provide 
a pilot with the option of authorizing launch. A human still 
decides upon the most suitable means of attack, though in reality 
their “choices” are likely to be fairly restricted. One such option 
is likely to be an air-to-air munition, which, if self-guiding, is 
arguably an EAI. Nevertheless, once the human operator 
 
170. As the Authors are currently examining elsewhere, certain nations may wish to 
indoctrinate military manuals, ROE, and other guidance to “ensure” that EAIs ensure 
that certain orders are followed, as opposed to refused. This may be the case, for 
example, where decision-making responsibilities are not generally delegated to the lower 
echelons of the military hierarchy. This may perhaps be due to issues with trust, but the 
point is, an EAI could potentially ensure orders that are very prescriptive in nature are 
followed closely. For a useful discussion, see Franz-Stefan Gady, Future Warfighting: 
Placing Doctrine Before Technology, SOUNDS STRATEGIC 29:09-33:15 (Jul. 20, 2020), 
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/podcast/2020/07/future-warfighting 
[https://perma.cc/C594-7ZT2]. 
171. Clearly, the central argument contained in the present thesis is that this will 
not always be the case. EAI tech is improving all the time. Take for example the U.S. 
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (“LRSAM”) which, by utilizing an “intelligent navigation 
and direct route” feature, is already able to carry out rudimentary distinction 
assessments. See Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, LOCKHEED MARTIN, 
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/mfc/pc/long-
range-anti-ship-missile/mfc-lrasm-pc-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/46E3-XSMJ] (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2021). Future technology may improve upon this in a number of ways. For 
example, as previously discussed, the weapon itself may contain technology that allows 
for it to carry out its own complex assessments. Or, an EAI could act as a commander, or 
even as a kind of military police officer that is used to “enforce the law.” In such an 
instance, nations would clearly have to decide upon, and programme their EAIs 
accordingly, with the necessary codes of conduct regarding matters such as the issuing 
of cease and desist commands, and guidance on the use of force when arresting and 
detaining “friendly” soldiers. 
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authorizes the application of force, there is usually no further 
“interference” from the platforms systems. 
However, if a pilot was involved in a “dog-fight,” and the 
platform they inhabited was programmed with the Authors’ 
RROE, the radar would similarly identify an enemy aircraft and 
alert the pilot accordingly. The pilot may then choose to fire (or 
not), based upon their assessment of the prevailing 
circumstances.172 If they, or perhaps the operator of a combat 
drone,173 decided to engage, System 1 would commence. 
Authentication in the circumstances would likely be satisfied 
when the pilot “logged in” at the start of their “shift.” And, System 
A would presumably verify the target. System B would then 
engage, and carry out an additional proportionality assessment to 
that of the pilots. Though arguably, in almost all instances, this 
would align with the pilot’s choice to deploy the munition. 
However, the EAI might be aware of extraneous circumstances 
(such as ground troops that at that moment were at risk of being 
hit by debris, or perhaps a high risk to the civilian population) 
that the pilot had not factored in due to inclement weather or to 
 
172. One additional discussion that could be had here is what part of the system 
was giving an order to fire, as opposed merely proving a direction? In other words, could 
authorization be delegated to a machine so that it could “indicate” that it had calculated 
the following attack, offering a definite military advantage, that it is lawful, ethical, and 
very likely to positively influence the course of the battle—Take the shot! Arguably there 
could be consequences if the human pilot failed to follow such an “order”—because 
he/she thought it better in the circumstances—perhaps only due to gut instinct. 
However, what if, due to not taking the shot, lives were lost, or ultimately, the battle was 
lost. Could/should it lead to a court martial, or criminal proceedings? Or, should it be 
of no consequence because the human pilot/operator used their “superior” (or 
hierarchical) judgement? In other words, should the “plane” be assigned a higher rank? 
This is the cyclical argument; the problem with threat of criminal sanctions is that the 
EAI does not change the status quo. EAI should be an improvement of the current 
balance of being able to refuse an order only in very limited circumstances, juxtaposed 
with military conditioning and potential criminal charges for insubordination. 
173. Note that UAVs are becoming much more capable than early Mk I Predator 
Drones, for example, which were first used by the United States in the 1990s. Initially 
these were used only used for reconnaissance missions. For an Mk I fact sheet, see MQ-
1B Predator, U.S. AIR FORCE (Sept. 2015), https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-
Sheets/Display/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator/ [https://perma.cc/FS8X-2MB8].  In 
contrast, rather than operating in relatively uncontested airspace the developers of 
contemporary UAV are looking to them replacing existing piloted air-to-air combat 
aircraft. See, e.g., Valerie Insinna, Boeing Rolls Out Australia’s First ‘Loyal Wingman’ Combat 
Drone, DEFENSE NEWS (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/05/04/boeing-rolls-out-australias-first-loyal-
wingman-combat-drone/ [https://perma.cc/F5RE-RXLD]. 
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a navigational error. Of course, each situation is highly contextual 
and there would not always be a strict obligation to not carry out 
the attack. Nevertheless, where appropriate, System 4A would be 
engaged. In this instance, passive refusal (4A(i)), or active refusal 
(4A(ii)) would be the most appropriate option, there not 
appearing to be a need for preventative refusal (4A(iii)) at this 
stage. 
If System 2 did calculate that distinction and proportionality 
were initially satisfied, Micro-System 2C would engage. This 
micro-system identifies whether the means and method were 
appropriate, and that their selection would, as much as is 
practicably possible, minimize civilian harms. If the Micro-system 
2C assessment identified a grounds for refusing the order, System 
4A is engaged—subject to caveats. If, however, the three 
components of System 2 were satisfied, the instruction would not 
be intercepted and the munition would be deployed (as per 
System 4B). Due, inter alia, to the systems’ speed of operation, the 
speed of the tactical pursuit, and to the battlefield conditions, a 
System 3 assessment might be unnecessary in such circumstances. 
However, if System 3 was engaged, the EAI would then consider 
other matters such as any relevant ROE. These would go further 
than legal obligations, and might identify, for example, whether 
the platform was operating in a pre-determined “no-fly zone” or 
whether there were any other policies or local level restrictions in 
place. Under such circumstances, the EAI might engage System 
4A, and refuse to follow the order. 
While there may be a slight increase in the risk faced by the 
pilot, the introduction of the multi-stage test is a positive method 
for reducing friction, in much the same way as an anti-stall 
mechanism.174 And, if the RROE had been installed on the USS 
Vincennes in 1988, it may, for example, have detected the friend 
or foe signal that was being sent out by the civilian aircraft Iran 
Air Flight 655.175 As a result the missile may not have been 
launched, and the civilian aircraft not destroyed. 
 
174. Note that with the increased use of unmanned technologies in armed conflict, 
and the possibility of further advances in fully autonomous tech, it is arguable that such 
systems could and perhaps should hesitate before deploying force, due entirely to the 
fact that no human life is in direct risk. See, e.g., Sassoli, supra note 18, at 327-28.  
175. See SCHARRE, supra note 92, at 169-70 (discussing the facts of the USS 
Vincennes and that fateful incident). Similarly, the same test may have also prevented 
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Returning to Scenario 2 however, if “Track 1” was followed 
(as opposed to the test considered above), the results would differ 
for a number of reasons. This may be due to the decision-maker 
not believing it “reasonable” to deploy an aircraft fitted with an 
EAI system in the first place. In addition, even where a decision 
monitoring EAI was utilized, Track 1 only requires an order to be 
refused where it was a manifestly unlawful order. As a result, with 
distinction and proportionality satisfied, Track 1 would not 
intercept, regardless of whether there were political, or wider 
tactical or operational reasons not to. Similarly, for reasons 
previously discussed, though “Track 3” systems would require the 
EAI to be deployed in all circumstances in which it was available, 
the EAI itself would be obligated to consider a number of 
conceptual matters, including the dignity of the pilot and the 
target, and of any civilian that was included in the proportionality 
assessment. 
D. Scenario 3 
The following scenario is used to extend the analysis beyond 
the human decision to use a particular type of weapon (means), 
to a robot decision to use a particular tactic (method) to reach 
certain ends.  For the purpose of Scenario 3, let us suppose the 
“end” is to obtain information from an “adversary.” There are, of 
course, many ways in this scenario could be presented. 
Nevertheless, the following is proposed: an AWS, in the form of a 
humanoid combatant, receives an order from an EAI located in a 
command-and-control center. The AWS is to “secure a block” in 
which a large number of enemy combatants are located, and to 
retrieve, “by any means necessary” information regarding a 
suspected future attack. Here, System 1 authentication is likely to 
be fairly straightforward with sensors and additional programs 
(including destination verification) capable of authenticating the 
status of the order-giver. Nevertheless, the analysis must be 
divided in two, given that there are two independent orders. The 
first is to secure a location. Arguably, here, the AWS analysis is 
 
the recent shooting down of Ukraine Air Flight 752 by Iranian armed forces on January 
8, 2020. See Michael Safi, Iran Admits it Fired Two Missiles at Ukrainian Passenger Jet, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/21/iran-
admits-it-fired-two-missiles-at-ukrainian-passenger-jet [https://perma.cc/52Q5-4XGN]. 
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similar to that considered in Scenario 2. Should System 1 and 
System 2 be satisfied, System 3 would engage and determine 
whether the order is consistent with IHL and the more focused 
ROE. The same arguments would be applied in respect of Track 
1 and Track 3 application as considered above, and to avoid 
repetition, there is not a pressing need to consider the entire 
RROE again at this point. 
However, in this scenario the System 3 assessment is key with 
regard to the second order to obtain information, because there 
clearly an element of ambiguity—how does the order-giver define 
“any means necessary”? There are a number of options, the most 
obvious being that clarification needs to be sought. However, if 
this was not possible there is a choice of two primary 
interpretations. In the first instance, it might be taken to mean by 
any means necessary; providing that they are consistent with 
international legal obligations. If this was the case, then a similar 
assessment would be conducted to that already considered. 
However, a second way in which this instruction might be 
implemented is—by any means necessary (regardless of 
international obligations). With regard to the latter, the most 
appropriate retort would be that where a customary duty exists 
for a human soldier to disobey a manifestly unlawful order, it 
must also apply to an AWS. As a result, an AWS, like its human 
equivalent, must, for example, refuse to follow an order to gain 
information with the use of torturous methods.176 
A question that arises, however, is what if there is military 
doctrine to the contrary? This occurred, for example, in the 
United States, under the Presidency of George W. Bush. In this 
 
176. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (“Convention Against Torture”) art. 1, June 26, 1987, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 (defining torture as: “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or 
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions.”). See also ICRC Customary Rules, supra note 32 (ICRC Customary Rule 30 
notes that Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the ICC Statute removes the need for the suffering to be 
inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”). 
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instance, the United States attempted to greatly reduce the 
definition of torture, and in doing so justify the use of certain 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading acts that it had carried out. The 
United States argued that these acts did not violate its 
international obligations, because they claimed that the acts did 
not meet the requisite intensity of pain and suffering.177 The 
result, as argued by at least one commentator, was that despite the 
fact that Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention Against Torture178 
placed certain restrictions upon military interrogators, the CIA 
was authorized “to confine and interrogate detainees with a 
harshness that markedly violated human rights.”179 
 In the present scenario, if torture was authorized, and 
indeed ordered, arguably it would be refused by any AWS/EAI, 
whether it applied the Track 1, Track 2, or Track 3 approach. Of 
course, a decision-maker employing the former may not consider 
it reasonable to utilize an EAI for this type of assessment in the 
first instance. Nevertheless, given that military manuals typically 
provide a great deal more detail regarding a soldier’s obligations 
than that which is provided by IHL alone, it might also be argued 
that the AWS would have an obligation to follow the order if the 
ROE appeared to reflect recent changes in national policy or best 
practice. In such a situation however, the Authors propose that 
because EAI/AWS are a “method” of ensuring compliance with 
international obligations, they must reflect the hierarchy of 
sources. Thus, military doctrine should be used to support and 
interpret treaty provisions, and not as a method to negate or 
lessen their effects. And, when this principle is applied to the 
 
177. Richard D. Rosen, America’s Professional Military Ethic and the Treatment of 
Captured Enemy Combatants in the Global War on Terror, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 118 
n.31 (2007) (citing Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto 
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Subject: Standards for Interrogation under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002)). 
178. Article 2 of the Convention Against Torture states: “1. Each State Party shall 
take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of 
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. 2. No exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any 
other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture. 3. An order from a 
superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture.” 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
179. Robert Bejesky, Pruning Non-Derogative Human Rights Violations into an 
Ephemeral Shame Sanction, 58 LOY. L. REV. 821, 824-25 (2012). 
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present particulars, system 2 would either prevent the AWS from 
carrying out a tortuous act, or, where an EAI is operating in a 
supervisory mode, prevent a human subordinate from doing so.180 
E. Scenario 4 
The previous two scenarios have considered situations where 
an EAI might be utilized to assess an order, and where necessary, 
to refuse to follow it. In either case the analysis concluded that by 
applying the RROE, refusal can take place due to an order failing 
to adhere to the fundamental principles of IHL (or the wider 
body of applicable international law), or, where an order is 
otherwise inconsistent with matters of national policy, or is, in 
other words, not of use for service. In this final and undoubtedly 
most extreme “application” of “robot refusal,” the Authors seek 
to consider the practicalities and logistics of refusal in the context 
of nuclear launch.181 
Ostensibly, an autonomous “operating system” could 
ultimately override a launch instruction, whether that originated 
from a human or an EAI. As a result, while the scenario that 
follows considers a set of prescribed “facts,” the relationships are 
interchangeable, and not strictly limited to those considered. The 
EAI could, for example, be interchanged with an AWS, or a 
human could be swapped out for an AWS. However, at some 
point, the order must be run through an EAI. In direct contrast 
to Scenario 2, whereby the acquiring of missile lock is more of a 
strategic assist, for the EAI in this fourth scenario (preventing 
unlawful nuclear launch as a result of system of systems) is a 
“legal” assist. 
The scenario considered has the following characteristics, 
with the caveat that the act in question is scrutinized under the 
jus in bello, as opposed to the jus ad bellum:182 State A is at war with 
 
180. Subject to the caveats identified in supra note 171. 
181. Note that an investigation into the extent of the soldier’s duty to refuse to obey 
a manifestly unlawful order to launch a nuclear weapon has already been carried out by 
at least one author. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Duty to Disobey Illegal Nuclear Strike Orders, 
9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 84 (2018). The purpose of the current discussion is to consider 
how an EAI might help to ensure that duty is adhered to. 
182. The point being that the circumstances that are presented in the following 
scenario are intended to be examined under DTP, and not in relation, for example to 
Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, the latter of which the Authors are in the process 
of addressing in an accompanying piece. 
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State B, both of whom are nuclear powers. In the midst of this 
“peer-on-peer” conflict, the President of State A (X) authorizes a 
nuclear attack. Following current strategic command principles, 
this order goes to strategic command, and to a central war office. 
The order to initiate the attack is then forwarded on to submarine 
commander (Y), and to General (Z), who oversees two or more 
additional launch sites. Shortly after the instruction to initiate the 
attack is received by Y and Z, all communications are lost.183 The 
reader may at this stage recall such a scenario being captured in 
the 1995 motion picture, “Crimson Tide.” Here, Denzel 
Washington’s character wishes to re-establish radio 
communications to determine whether a further but unreadable 
message from strategic command has overridden a previous 
nuclear launch order. In contrast Gene Hackman’s character 
portrays the somewhat more belligerent X who believes that the 
initial order for nuclear launch should be followed without 
question. 
In terms of the present scenario (and not an appraisal of the 
motion picture), the Authors’ system of systems requires System 
1 authentication. This is clearly a vital stage, but is also one at 
which the potential for EAI monitoring could be introduced. 
Currently, looking to US nuclear doctrine, the president carries a 
personal identification tool, which contains a code that is unique 
to the president—known colloquially as the “biscuit.”184 When 
necessary, this code can be entered into an authorization system 
that is carried by a constantly rotating military presence, and 
which accompanies the President at all times. This system is 
known as the nuclear, or atomic, “football.”185 
In the first instance, these “biscuits” and “footballs” ensure 
that the order can be authenticated. Potentially, for the sub 
 
183. It could, for example, be due to the command and control suffering an 
overwhelming attack, or due to a devastating cyber-attack. 
184. See Michael Dobbs, The Real Story of the “Football” That Follows the President 
Everywhere: Take a peek at the mysterious black briefcase that has accompanied every U.S. president 
since John F. Kennedy, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/real-story-football-follows-president-
everywhere-180952779/ [https://perma.cc/Y9GQ-7ZFX]; Kirsten Korosec, Trump 
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commander, this might implicitly engage System 2. However, a 
central question here is, could, or indeed should the “football” 
be an EAI? If it were, and the order was erroneous, it could be 
prevented from even making it through to strategic command. Of 
more general application, the Authors wish to underline that EAI 
analysis is at its most beneficial the higher up the command chain 
it takes place (at least in the first instance).186 And, the football 
might also be pre-programmed with the correct strategic 
response—given the circumstances—leading to faster decision 
making. However, if the decision monitoring EAI were not the 
“football,” the order could still be passed to a Strategic command 
or Central War Office EAI, where the order would face the same 
scrutiny.187   
Once an erroneous order has passed to individuals Y and Z, 
the task of intercepting it is likely to become more difficult. 
Indeed, when such an order is passed from one to two (or more 
parties), it might result in the slightly curious case where one part 
of the launch team disobeys the order, while another implements 
it without hesitation. Arguably, in this instance, recall would be 
particularly problematic, and probably all too late.188 This could 
be prevented with the use an EAI. EAI assessment could provide 
an additional safeguard at whichever stage it is considered, but 
also, perhaps the more often it is utilized.189 Therefore, although 
the EAI analysis that follows is largely considered at the launch 
level, the stages of assessment could be considered at any point 
during the lifetime of the order.190 
All System 2 assessments must clearly be made with due 
respect to the huge devastation potential that nuclear missiles 
carry. However, given a particular set of circumstances, a nuclear 
weapon could potentially “target” a military installation in 
 
186. This is of course true whether considering the scenario with or without the 
introduction of EAI technology. Colangelo, supra note 181, at 90. 
187. Indeed, in the United States there is a “two-man rule,” which, in short, means 
that the order to launch a nuclear attack is verified by two separate individuals, at every 
stage in the chain of command. Id. at 114-15. It is at least conceivable that an EAI could 
replace one of those humans at every stage of the process. 
188. See supra note 148. 
189. Though this is, of course, subject to the condition that the tech each stage is 
functioning correctly. Nevertheless, because an EAI cannot authorise force, the impact 
of malfunctioning equipment is lessened, as compared, for example, to AWS. 
190. See supra note 187. 
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adherence with the principle of distinction. With regards to 
proportionality however, System 2B might need to be satisfied on 
the condition that the launch, and all of the anticipated collateral 
damage, has been authorized at the strategic level. Existing 
safeguards are no doubt in place for instances where the nuclear 
order-giver suffers from temporary insanity, or where they choose 
to dispense an order due to ill health, blackmail, inducement, 
treachery, etc. However, at the sub level, this would be difficult to 
determine. Nevertheless, where there was no evidence of a 
legitimate military target, or, there was evidence to suggest that 
the target was the “civilian population,” the EAI could, without 
fear for its job, its societal standing, its life, and the lives of its 
“nearest and dearest” etc., refuse to follow the order.191 
Where Systems 2A and 2B were satisfied however, System 2C 
would engage. Given the gravity attached to a nuclear launch, one 
might posit that the standard for target verification should reflect 
something greater than mere “reasonable” steps, and perhaps, in 
reality, this is likely to be the case. Nonetheless, for an EAI system 
programmed according to Track 1, reasonableness would remain 
the minimum requirement. The matter of whether feasible 
precautions had been taken (or not) would, once again, be highly 
context dependent. If, for example, an EAI was stationed with the 
Commander and had, prior to launch and loss of comms, 
evaluated that state A had attempted all other appropriate means 
and methods of defeating the enemy, the order to launch would 
not be intercepted. 
However, if the EAI applying the RROE calculated that an 
alternative means or method would yield a similar result, it should 
intercept the order and prevent launch, at least until more 
information regarding the status of the order could be gathered. 
In contrast, an EAI operating Track 1 would arguably not 
intercept the same order, due to the fact that so long as 
distinction and proportionality were satisfied, and the order was 
“reasonable” in the circumstances, there appears to be no 
evidence of a manifestly unlawful order. This standpoint is in 
 
191. Indeed, as identified by Colangelo, supra note 181, at 92, due to the unique 
destructive nature of nuclear weapons, “where conventional weapons can be used in 
proximity to civilians to achieve the same or similar military objectives . . . an order to 
use a nuclear weapon would be manifestly illegal and anyone with sufficient factual 
knowledge regarding the circumstances of the order should know it.” 
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itself contrary, to the Track 3 requirement to always use the means 
and method that minimizes civilian harms, and to carry out any 
analysis subject to factors such as whether there is a reasonable 
chance of mission success. Due to the circumstances and the 
chances of initiating a nuclear apocalypse, this is as the very least 
questionable. 
Where RROE is utilized, however, where System 2 does not 
identify grounds for refusing an order, System 3 would be 
engaged. And, it is here that RROE offer the most focused 
assessment when compared to either of the two extremes. For 
example, as noted, an EAI applying Track 1 would only deny 
manifestly unlawful orders. This is vital because, nuclear weapons 
do not distinguish between combatant and civilian. Moreover, a 
legitimate military target that was positioned close to a densely 
populated urban area would mean that there would be a 
considerable level of collateral damage (not to mention the 
comprehensive costs of all out nuclear war). 
With that in mind, it is arguable that a nuclear attack would 
always be disproportionate in IHL terms. However, in providing 
their Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ identified this may 
not always be the case.192 Consequently, any “legitimate” order to 
initiate a nuclear launch could be a lawful order, and if this was 
the case in this scenario, the Track 1 analysis would not intercept. 
In contrast (except, perhaps, where all other means and methods 
 
192. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 29, ¶ 97. See also MINISTRY OF 
DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 6.17 (2004) 
(“There is no specific rule of international law, express or implied, which prohibits the 
use of nuclear weapons. The legality of their use depends upon the application of the 
general rules of international law, including those regulating the use of force and the 
conduct of hostilities”). “There are no rules of customary or conventional international 
law prohibiting nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict. In the 
absence of such an express prohibition, the use of nuclear weapons against enemy 
combatants and other military objectives is not unlawful. Employment of nuclear 
weapons is, however, subject to the following principles: the right of the parties to the 
conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; it is prohibited to launch 
attacks against the civilian population as such; and distinction must be made at all times 
between combatants and civilians to the effect that the latter be spared as much as 
possible.” DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS § 10.2.1 (2007). See generally Practice Relating to Nuclear Weapons, IHL 
DATABASE, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_nuwea 
[https://perma.cc/8A27-DYKY] (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).  
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had been attempted), it is difficult to imagine a set of 
circumstances where an EAI operating on Track 3 would not 
decide to intercept the same order, which contestably places too 
great a weight upon the humanitarian end of the spectrum. 
System 3, however, having considered the same set of 
relevant legal provisions as the Track 1 system would move on to 
consider the wider body of legal obligations. Importantly, this 
would include all relevant ROE—including those relating 
specifically to nuclear launch (which, given the weapon, are likely 
to be extremely concise). Moreover, in the knowledge that a post-
human analysis of an order to initiate a nuclear launch was likely, 
future ROE would include specific reference to the role in which 
an EAI should play. Vitally, as identified in Scenario 3, these ROE 
cannot be used to side-step existing international legal 
obligations, but only to provide a greater detail of the strategic, 
operational, and tactical methods of enforcing them. 
If the order to launch a nuclear attack was a legitimate order, 
there would be no reason for the EAI intercept it (though given 
the circumstances, the engagement of system 4B(ii) might be the 
more preferable outcome). As previously discussed, the case for 
non-interception may be stronger the higher up the command 
chain the EAI analysis is completed. However, where the EAI 
examination took place at the level of the submarine 
commander, and where communication was lost in the process of 
receiving an “update” form strategic command, these ROE may 
prove vital. No doubt the commander would also have some 
access to these ROE, and would of course be a highly skilled, well 
informed, individual. 
Nevertheless, a commander cannot be expected to apply the 
same legal acumen to a potentially voluminous set of instructions, 
as would a New York Bar attorney. Moreover, they could not be 
expected  to do so at speeds anything like the  data-processing 
capabilities of a supercomputer—especially not when the same 
individual’s entire training and preparation for events such as this 
would have been succinctly grounded in the obligation to strictly 
follow orders. If an EAI were instead tasked with analysing all 
available data, including all relevant national doctrine, there 
would be a much greater opportunity to identify whether the 
order was consistent with matters of law, policy, and best practice, 
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and the commander could be more confident that they were 
making the right decision.   
Importantly, however, if the EAI did not detect an 
abnormality here, or indeed any other permitted reason to 
intercept the order, the order must be followed. Nonetheless, 
where there is reason to “suspect” an order was, for example, 
overwritten, or that it was given with malicious intent, it could be 
refused by the EAI. Prima facie, preventative refusal may seem the 
most appropriate course of action here. However, it is arguable 
whether states would employ such a system in a nuclear setting. 
Instead, and perhaps in somewhat of a complete reversal, it is 
proposed that passive refusal is the most appropriate “type” of 
refusal for the following reasons. First, strategic decision making 
will ultimately remain firmly in the hands of humans, but 
secondly, by operating in such a way, the EAI might demonstrate 
something akin to a “gut feeling”—a word of caution, as opposed 
to an absolute rebuttal. Such a system would therefore assist a 
commander instead of discounting their experience and rank. 
V. WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOT REFUSAL 
This penultimate Section extends this controversial 
discussion into three further areas of analysis: the application of 
“Robot Refusal” in the context of robot PMCs, spies, and more 
provocatively, whether RROE should include insubordination for 
EAIs. By way of brief caveat, the Authors do not intend to “close” 
the discussion in each of these areas but rather, wish to open 
these areas in the first instance for future discussion, and much-
needed debate. The specific PMC “angle” is whether, and to what 
extent, an EAI PMC is perhaps more or less likely to disobey 
orders compared with their human counterparts. It is relatively 
uncontroversial to suggest that one of the primary motivating 
factors for a human PMC partaking in a theatre of conflict will be 
one of financial reward. Extending this argument a little further 
may prompt the reasonable conclusion that PMCs (in light of this 
“added value” or “financial incentive”) are less likely to refuse an 
order. Indeed, should the PMC refuse or disobey an order, or at 
the very least not successfully complete the mission, extra 
enumerations may be affected. Meanwhile, an EAI PMC would 
presumably not have that extra variable “present” (unless the EAI 
is remunerated or motivated by Bitcoin or other crypto 
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currencies). The Authors therefore conclude that the addition to 
the “system of systems” presented above, combined with the 
removal of the “mercenary” factor in the traditional sense, would 
mean that there would be no reason as to why an EAI PMC would 
feel less inclined to fail to disobey or refuse an illegal order. 
The inclusion of spies within this discussion is to highlight 
an instance whereby a “retired” combat EAI transitions from 
SEAL Team 6 and begins employment at the “Agency”—a not 
altogether uncommon career path. If the EAI spook mirrored 
that particular human career choice, would the EAI still retain (in 
the event it hadn’t undertaken a separate training at the “Farm” 
in Langley, Virginia) its existing system of systems programming? 
If this were to be the case, and the “hard drive” was not 
“reformatted,” an order to target a dissident on London Bridge 
with a poisoned tipped umbrella, would ultimately be rejected—
assuming of course that all EAIs were equally equipped with the 
same system of systems set out in Part IV. As with the previous 
inclusion of RROE in the PMC world, one could have a similar 
instance whereby the variation in programming could result in 
intelligence agents acting differently depending where they had 
“undertaken” their initial training or programming. 
Taken to its conclusion, were the EAI to wrongfully disobey 
an order, should it face consequences for insubordination? 
Clearly, and without being overly flippant (were one to apply such 
a discussion to an AWS) the very simple answer would be to 
reprogram the system. A less draconian approach may be some 
form of disciplinary action but what that may look like in practice, 
the Authors fully concede, is less tangible—loss of leave or pay is 
unlikely to perhaps have a motivating factor. Clearly, there would 
need to be a sliding scale, reflective of the increasing severity from 
mere insubordination to full-on mutiny and/or treason. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, this Article has sought to bring to the forefront a 
timely discussion regarding an EAI’s ability to refuse erroneous 
orders—particularly in light of the fact that there is no agreed 
position in terms of state practice or refusal of orders. The 
Authors have proposed the novel inclusion of a test in order to 
determine the precise limitations as to when and how this should 
happen. Therefore, the proposed RROE not only offer greater 
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clarity for now, but something distinctly concrete for the future. 
Whereas more traditional lines of thinking have rightly cautioned 
against an AWS or EAI’s ability to compute human emotions 
when making proportionality assessments, the Authors’ novel 
approach has been to reverse the thinking and suggest that the 
EAI is not only placed to understand human traits but can also 
override human error. 
Such action might be considered necessary in any number of 
scenarios. For example, where a human combatant has complied 
with their IHL requirements, but where factors such as self-
preservation or instinct have clouded their “human ability” to 
objectively make  proportionality assessments. In such an 
instance, the Authors recommend aborting launch. In making a 
decision as to whether to obey or disobey human error, the EAI 
should not only calculate the IHL “requirements” but also 
actively look to discount any “human factors” which may have 
influenced the decision. When it comes to an EAI responding to 
an EAI error, the Authors envisaged EAI/AI “checks,” carried out 
by a number of different systems in order to add an additional 
level of protection in order to identify and prevent rogue orders. 
In the very purest strategic sense this would indeed be the 
ultimate “system of systems.”   
Part II of the Article was the natural starting point for the 
discussion and revisited the key tenets of IHL in order to provide 
a logical interface between a combatant’s obligations under DTP 
and the right of refusal considered in Part III. As noted in Parts I 
and II which, forms part of the key concluding message once 
states are equipped with EAI, IHL may well compel their usage. 
Part III of the Article extended the discussion into differing 
thresholds for the refusal of orders. Here, the Authors 
summarized that the minimum standard as portrayed in the 
narrow obligation requires a member of the armed forces to 
strictly adhere to an order unless there is a customary duty to 
refuse on the grounds that it is manifestly unlawful. Perhaps 
somewhat unfortunately, the analysis identified that difficulties 
may arise when programming EAI to refuse, due to the fact the 
obligation operates more broadly. For some states, it is not a 
straightforward consideration as to the lawfulness of the order. 
Instead, a combatant adhering to the wider obligation must 
reconcile any order according to relatively abstract concepts such 
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as human dignity, while concurrently scrutinizing whether or not 
there is a reasonable chance of mission success, or whether the 
order is consistent with national policy. This leads to the 
eventuality, however, that existing practice is not only 
incongruous, but can also place too great an emphasis upon 
either military necessity or humanitarian considerations—both of 
which are elements that IHL, at its heart, strives to balance 
without bias. 
Part IV of the Article provided what the Authors believe is a 
robust legal “system of systems” not just with the intended effect 
of ensuring appropriate compliance or non-compliance from a 
legal perspective, but one that one would have strategic benefit 
too. It is perhaps overly tempting to suggest that Clausewitz’s idea 
of “total war” (where the “gloves come off”) is necessarily the 
appropriate strategic approach—the system envisaged by the 
Authors not only limits unlawful actions but ones which would 
also minimize and reduce strategic error as well. 
In Part V the Authors broadened the remit of the discussion 
and extended the discussion into a natural EAI career trajectory: 
PMC and espionage. Here the Authors note that the existence of 
EAI may well cause the gradual extinction of PMCs or at least in 
the sense of them operating as mercenaries. More problematic 
perhaps in both the realms of PMC and espionage is the “legacy” 
programming—the EAI’s original training and embedding of 
system of systems may prove ideal for IHL compliance but prevent 
ineffectual operational qualities. Quite simply, the system of 
systems programming may be too effective, and an EAI would 
refuse any of the “Black Ops” missions those realms frequent.193 
Too simplistic and broad a rebuttal to any such 
considerations undertaken in this work would be to simply 
dismiss such a discussion in the realms of “well . . . it depends on 
the algorithm.” What this Article has pinpointed and strived to 
comprehend, is precisely what such calculations would look like. 
 
193.  A final “footnote” to this discussion more generally, surrounding future use 
of PMCs is that their role may decrease rather than increase. While it is undeniable that 
the immediate future will see an ever-increasing presence of PMCs both in combat (and 
even more so in non-combat roles), the Authors contend that a natural re-shaping of the 
sector will occur. The very raison d’être of a PMC is financial reward as opposed to 
fighting for the flag—when such reward is no longer conceivable (in the future envisaged 
by the Authors) the existence of PMCs may continue, but they would no longer be 
mercenaries. 
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In terms of an AWS system it might be a continuous 
proportionality feedback assessment. In terms of EAI, in addition 
to the ongoing proportionality assessment, it is a series of 
additional checks and balances both to discount human error 
and emotion, and, indeed, to ensure an even greater level of 
compliance with IHL obligations. Clearly, this raised broader 
issues in terms of chain of command where the Authors 
questioned whether an EAI should be able to override a chain of 
command and concluded in the affirmative. 
To return to one example from the civilian “field” 
highlighted in the abstract—an aircraft’s anti stall mechanism’s 
potential to override human error—such overriding is seen as 
nothing but a positive.194 It is also perhaps important to 
distinguish that the system of systems proposed here is much 
stricter par excellence than say, an automotive vehicle’s system of 
systems—the car is unlikely to shut down and switch off (thus 
overriding its human controller) purely because they have 
ignored the wrench key, designating that the vehicle is in need of 
service or the coffee cup icon denoting the need for a break. In 
complete contrast, an EAI could, would, and should abort a 
nuclear launch if there are any “red flags” raised by the system of 
systems. The Authors believe that starting and opening this much-
needed dialogue for further debate will assist in the growth of 
scholarship in this area. It is the firm assertion of the Authors that 
under certain circumstances, “robot refusal” is preferable to 













194. See supra note 15. 
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